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“FAIRNESS AND JUSTICE” AFTER TAHOE-
SIERRA PRESERVATION COUNCIL, INC. V. 
TAHOE REGIONAL PLANNING AGENCY: 
SUBSEQUENT REGULATORY TAKINGS 
DECISIONS UNDER THE “PARCEL AS A 
WHOLE” FRAMEWORK 
INTRODUCTION 
Until the early twentieth century, the Fifth Amendment Takings 
Clause1 afforded compensation only when the government physically 
appropriated property.2 Over time, the Supreme Court recognized that 
fairness and justice demanded constitutional protection not only for 
physical takings, but also for regulatory takings.3 There are two principal 
types of regulatory takings: (1) those resulting in the physical occupation 
of property4 and (2) those stripping the owner of use of property.5 Courts 
 1. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment states, “nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendment makes 
the Fifth Amendment applicable to the states. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see, e.g., First English 
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 307 (1987). 
 2. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 322 (2002) 
(“Our jurisprudence involving condemnations and physical takings is as old as the Republic and, for 
the most part, involves the straightforward application of per se rules.”). In contrast to physical 
takings, which require compensation per se, regulatory takings did not historically receive any Fifth 
Amendment protection. John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and its Significance for Modern Takings 
Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252, 1292 (1996) (“[T]he Takings Clause means what it says about 
land use regulation: nothing. The reason the Framers did not address land use regulation in the Takings 
Clause is that they did not regard it as a taking.”); see also Coast Range Conifers, L.L.C. v. State, 76 
P.3d 1148, 1153–55 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) (detailing possible historical interpretations of the Takings 
Clause). 
 3. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (containing the oft-cited proposition that 
a taking occurs when the “[g]overnment . . . forc[es] some people alone to bear public burdens which, 
in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”). Regulatory takings are of a 
“recent vintage” in comparison to the physical appropriations and condemnations recognized prior to 
the Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon decision. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322; Penn. Coal Co. v. 
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922); see also infra notes 25–71 and accompanying text. 
 4. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982) (ritualistically 
cited for the proposition that a regulation that results in the physical occupation of property constitutes 
a per se taking); see also Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 240–41 (2003) (finding that 
Interest on Lawyers’ Trust Accounts (IOLTA) programs, which require lawyers to deposit client-funds 
into interest-bearing accounts for the benefit of those who cannot afford legal services, does not 
constitute a regulatory taking under Loretto); see also Tuthill Ranch, Inc. v. United States, 381 F.3d 
1132, 1135–39 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (recounting the history of per se physical takings before finding that 
the government’s lease of excess fiber optic capacity on pre-existing easement was not a per se 
physical taking). Physical occupation-type regulatory takings are sometimes classified separately from 
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agree that the first category of takings, regulatory takings resulting in a 
physical invasion, are per se unconstitutional.6 However, conflicting 
precedents govern the non-physical bulk of regulatory takings.7  
In an attempt to standardize takings analysis, the Supreme Court’s 
1978 Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City decision 
established a multi-factor test for determining whether a regulatory taking 
has occurred.8 The Penn Central test requires courts to evaluate (1) the 
regulation’s interference with investment-backed expectations; (2) the 
regulation’s impact on the property owner; and (3) the character of the 
government action.9 Later, in 1991, the Supreme Court adopted the per se 
temporary regulatory takings rule, giving property owners an alternative to 
the multi-factor test.10 However, in the 2002 Tahoe-Sierra Preservation 
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency11 decision, the Supreme 
Court effectively eliminated per se temporary takings by finding that two 
consecutive moratoria12 did not constitute a temporary taking.13 
regulatory takings entirely. Justine W. Stemple, Note, Take it or Leave it: The Supreme Court’s 
Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence After Tahoe-Sierra, 28 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 
163, 164 (2003). 
 5. Penn. Coal, 260 U.S. at 414–15. 
 6. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426. 
 7. See Woodland Manor, III Assocs. v. Reisma, No. PC89-2447, 2003 R.I. Super. LEXIS 35, at 
*45 (R.I. Super. Ct. Feb. 24, 2003) (“The morass of takings law is replete with contradictions, complex 
rules, incompatible decisions, and divergent interpretations.”); see also Sheffield Dev. Co. v. City of 
Glenn Heights, 140 S.W.3d 660, 671 (Tex. 2004) (likening takings jurisprudence to “a sophistic 
Miltonian Serbonian Bog”) (citing City of Austin v. Teague, 570 S.W.2d 389, 391 (Tex. 1978)). 
 8. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); see infra notes 32–54 
and accompanying text. 
 9. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124. 
 10. See infra notes 32–54 and accompanying text. 
 11. 535 U.S. 302 (2002). 
 12. Moratoria are useful government planning tools. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 337–38 (noting 
that “the consensus in the planning community appears to be that moratoria, or ‘interim development 
controls’ as they are often called, are an essential tool of successful development”); see also DANIEL 
R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 6.06 (4th ed. 1997) [hereinafter MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW]. 
Governments typically use moratoria to delay particular activities during planning periods. Wendie L. 
Kellington, Challenging and Defending Moratoria, 2003 LAND USE INSTITUTE 913, 915. In addition 
to pausing development during planning periods, governments often use moratoria to halt development 
when the government lacks sufficient public facilities to service that development. MANDELKER, 
LAND USE LAW, supra, § 6.06. 
 Moratoria are also one potential cloak for regulatory takings. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 341 
(cautioning that “any moratorium that lasts for more than one year should be viewed with special 
skepticism”). By definition, moratoria are temporary “delays” rather than permanent “takings.” 
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1072 (2d ed. 1989) (defining “moratorium” as “[a] postponement, an 
agreed delay, a deliberate temporary suspension (of some activity, etc.).”). Despite their temporary 
nature, the Takings Clause governs moratoria. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 325–26, 340–42 
(evaluating the constitutionality of a thirty-two month moratorium under the Takings Clause). 
Accordingly, land use planners must recognize the constitutional bounds of these restrictions on land 
use under the Fifth Amendment. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss4/9
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There is little agreement among scholars about the impact of Tahoe-
Sierra.14 Many contend that Tahoe-Sierra was narrowly crafted to 
minimize its impact on regulatory takings jurisprudence.15 Others argue 
the decision will have a broad impact on takings jurisprudence through its 
reaffirmation of the “parcel as a whole” approach to the denominator 
problem.16 Additionally, environmentalists applaud the decision as an 
important victory.17  
 According to land use experts St. Amand and Merriam, the six requirements of a constitutionally 
defensible moratorium are: (1) the government must have the authority to enact the moratorium; (2) 
the moratorium must serve a legitimate public health or safety objective; (3) the moratorium must be 
limited to the shortest possible time period; (4) the moratorium must pertain to the smallest physical 
area possible; (5) the moratorium should limit the smallest number of uses of the property as possible, 
allowing for some alternate uses of the property during the moratorium if at all possible; and (6) the 
moratorium should provide alternatives and exceptions if possible. Matthew G. St. Amand & Dwight 
H. Merriam, Defensible Moratoria: The Law Before and After the Sierra-Tahoe Decision, 2003 LAND 
USE INSTITUTE 925, 958–59. With regard to the second requirement, aesthetics and tourism would not 
qualify as adequate public interests to justify moratoria. Id. With regard to the third requirement, there 
is no set time period for constitutionally defensible moratoria. Id. at 940. While Tahoe-Sierra has 
ramifications for all six qualities of a defensible moratorium, the holding particularly affects the 
duration of a defensible moratoria. See infra notes 91–96, 232–35 and accompanying text. 
 13. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 326; see infra notes 91–96 and accompanying text. 
 14. The only universally acceptable statement about Tahoe-Sierra’s impact may be that it 
remains uncertain. See David M. Callies & Calvert G. Chipcase, Moratoria and Musings on 
Regulatory Takings: Tahoe–Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 25 U. 
HAW. L. REV. 279, 281 (2003). Callies and Chipcase caution against making concrete predictions 
about Tahoe-Sierra’s ramifications for moratoria: “Reading more into the case from a planning 
perspective is like looking into a crystal ball, and the proverbial ‘ground glass’ warning applies.” Id.; 
see also Lise Johnson, Note, After Tahoe Sierra, One Thing is Clearer: There Is Still a Fundamental 
Lack of Clarity, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 353, 375–77 (2004) (proposing deference to regulatory bodies as a 
resolution to the persisting subjectivity of takings jurisprudence after Tahoe-Sierra).  
 15. The majority notes three times that its decision in Tahoe-Sierra is a narrow one. Tahoe-
Sierra, 535 U.S. at 307, 314, 318. Many agree with the Court’s own statement of narrowness. See, e.g., 
Michael M. Berger, Tahoe-Sierra: Much Ado About-What?, 25 U. HAW. L. REV. 295, 295–96 (2003); 
Callies & Chipcase, supra note 14, at 280; St. Amand & Merriam, supra note 12, at 928. 
 The petition for certiorari in Tahoe-Sierra asks: “[I]s it permissible for the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals to hold—as a matter of law—that a temporary moratorium can never require constitutional 
compensation?” Berger, supra, at 306. The narrower question before the Court as termed in the 
resulting grant of certiorari was “[w]hether the Court of Appeals properly determined that a temporary 
moratorium on land development does not constitute a taking of property requiring compensation 
under the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution?” Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. 
Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 533 U.S. 948, 949 (2001). Berger notes that the grant of certiorari 
allowed the Supreme Court to answer a narrower question than the one actually posed by the appeal: 
“Notwithstanding the Ninth Circuit’s absolutist negative analysis that moratoria are not takings, no 
matter how long they last, the Petitioners were tasked with arguing the absolutist opposite, for 
example, that all moratoria are per se takings, no matter how short.” Berger, supra, at 306.  
 16. See, e.g., Thomas E. Roberts, Regulatory Takings in the Wake of Tahoe-Sierra and the 
IOLTA Decision, 35 URB. LAW. 759, 759 (2003) (noting five significant effects of Tahoe-Sierra). 
 17. David G. Savage, Hitting the Brakes: A Pro-Property Rights Juggernaut Stalls on the Shores 
of Lake Tahoe, 88 A.B.A. J. 32, 32 (May 2002) (“The 6–3 ruling is an important victory for 
environmentalists and land-use planners. It reaffirms the government's broad authority to control 
development and regulate property.”); Thomas J. Koffer, What to “Take” from Palazzolo and Tahoe-
Washington University Open Scholarship
p1513 Lydigsen book pages.doc6/21/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
1516 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 82:1513 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This Note will examine the holding of Tahoe-Sierra and its effects on 
regulatory takings jurisprudence. Part I recounts some of the major pre-
Tahoe-Sierra Supreme Court precedent governing regulatory takings.18 
Next, Part II details the Supreme Court’s holding in Tahoe-Sierra.19 Part 
III reviews federal and state court decisions that have applied the Tahoe-
Sierra decision.20 Part IV examines the effects of Tahoe-Sierra on 
regulatory takings law as demonstrated by subsequent judicial 
interpretation.21 Part IV also predicts that strict application of the “parcel 
as a whole” rule may lead to inequitable results.22 Part IV then details how 
some courts have already combated these potential inequities.23 This Note 
concludes that courts may attempt to either avoid the “parcel as a whole” 
framework or remold the character of the government action factor as a 
means to offset the economic impact factor under the “parcel as a whole” 
rule.24 
I. TEMPORARY REGULATORY TAKINGS PRE-TAHOE-SIERRA 
A. The Foundations of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence 
In 1922, Justice Holmes set out the foundations of modern regulatory 
takings jurisprudence in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.25 Pennsylvania 
Coal usurped Mugler v. Kansas,26 which, for the preceding fifty years, had 
provided deference to the government’s regulatory power.27 Justice 
Sierra: A Temporary Loss for Property Rights, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 503, 506–07 (2003) (recounting 
environmentalists reactions to Tahoe-Sierra); Richard J. Lazarus, Essay: Celebrating Tahoe-Sierra, 33 
ENVTL. L. 1, 13–14 (2003) (detailing the benefits of Tahoe-Sierra from an environmentalist’s 
perspective).  
 18. See infra notes 25–71 and accompanying text. 
 19. See infra notes 72–111 and accompanying text. 
 20. See infra notes 112–222 and accompanying text. 
 21. See infra notes 223–99 and accompanying text. 
 22. See infra notes 250–58 and accompanying text. 
 23. See infra notes 259–99 and accompanying text. 
 24. See infra notes 300–09 and accompanying text; see also Steven J. Eagle, “Character” as 
“Worthiness”: A New Meaning for Penn Central’s Third Test?, 27 NO. 6 ZONING & PLANNING L. 
REP. 1, 2–3 (2004). 
 25. Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); see Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe 
Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 325 (2002) (“[I]t was Justice Holmes’ opinion in Pennsylvania 
Coal Co. v. Mahon, that gave birth to our regulatory takings jurisprudence.” (internal citation 
omitted)); see also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992). 
 26. 123 U.S. 623 (1887). 
 27. Penn. Coal, 260 U.S. at 418, 422 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (citing Mugler v. Kansas, 123 
U.S. 623, 668–69 (1887)); see also Pat A. Cerundolo, Note, The Limited Impact of Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council on Massachusetts Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. 
L. REV. 431, 433 (1998). Justice Brandeis cites to a long line of cases that followed Mugler. See, e.g., 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss4/9
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Holmes acknowledged the necessity of government regulation, but he also 
recognized that regulatory measures constitute takings when they go “too 
far,” and have the effect of appropriating or destroying a property 
interest.28 In 1960, the Armstrong v. United States29 Court voiced the 
equally qualitative notions of fairness and justice as the underlying 
principles governing regulatory takings.30 While the notions in these cases 
have framed regulatory takings jurisprudence, neither decision provides 
much guidance for determining when a regulation becomes a taking.31 
B. Penn Central: The Regulatory Taking “Defined” and the Birth of the 
“Parcel as a Whole” Approach to the Denominator Problem 
To fill the gaps left by Pennsylvania Coal and other early regulatory 
takings decisions, the Supreme Court developed three factors for 
identifying regulatory takings in Penn Central.32 Courts must consider: (1) 
the regulation’s interference with the property owner’s investment-backed 
expectations;33 (2) the regulation’s economic impact on the property 
Pierce Oil Corp. v. City of Hope, 248 U.S. 498 (1919); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); 
Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 683 (1887). Mugler has resurfaced recently in takings 
jurisprudence. See, e.g., Edmonson v. Pearce, 91 P.3d 605, 617–18 (Okla. 2004) (reaffirming Mugler 
as sound precedent for rejecting a takings claim against a statute outlawing cockfighting). 
 28. Penn. Coal, 260 U.S. at 415. Justice Holmes’ famous statement for the majority reads, “while 
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if the regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a 
taking.” Id.  
 29. 364 U.S. 40 (1960). 
 30. Id. at 49; see supra note 3. 
 31. The “less than self-defining,” Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001), nature of 
Justice Holmes’ statements have been the subject of regulatory takings debate for the last seventy 
years. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015. In fact, if Pennsylvania Coal were to arise today it is unlikely that a 
taking would be found. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 
(1987) (finding no taking because the interest in the coal and the interest in the land in its entirety 
could not be considered separately); see also Machipongo Land & Coal Co. v. Commonwealth, 799 
A.2d 751, 756, 770 (Pa. 2002) (holding that no taking occurred under similar circumstances because 
interest in land and coal could not be separated).  
 32. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).  
 33. Characterization of investment-backed expectations lends itself to circular reasoning. Lucas, 
505 U.S. at 1034 (Kennedy, J., concurring). These expectations depend on how an owner will expect a 
court to react, which in turn depends on the owner’s expectations. Id. (“[F]or if the owner’s reasonable 
expectations are shaped by what the courts allow as a proper exercise of governmental authority, 
property tends to become what courts say it is.”). In Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, the Supreme Court 
recently tackled the timing of a regulation’s effect on “reasonable investment–backed expectations.” 
Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 626. The majority noted that a new property owner who has acquired title to 
property affected by a previously enacted restriction does not have “notice” such that the new property 
owner is barred from a takings claim. Id. However, the timing of regulations does affect the reasonable 
investment-backed expectations under the Penn Central analysis. Id. at 633 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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owner;34 and (3) the character of the government action.35 Although Penn 
Central purported to standardize regulatory takings jurisprudence by 
requiring consideration of these three factors,36 the Supreme Court 
cautioned courts about the need for ad hoc factual inquiries regarding each 
factor.37  
The Penn Central decision concentrates on the economic impact and 
character factors. The Court’s analysis regarding the economic impact 
factor gave birth to the “parcel as a whole” approach.38 Gauging the 
economic impact on the property owner due to a regulation requires courts 
to compare the property owner’s loss (the numerator) to some other value 
(the denominator). The identity of this “other value” is the essence of the 
“denominator problem.” 39 The Penn Central Court proposed a “parcel as a 
whole” solution to the denominator problem:40 the owner’s loss (the 
numerator) in relation to the value of the property as a whole (the 
denominator) constitutes the economic impact on a property owner in a 
regulatory takings case.41  
The application of the “parcel as a whole” rule to the facts in Penn 
Central is illustrative. In Penn Central, the plaintiffs owned numerous 
properties in midtown Manhattan, including Grand Central Terminal 
(Terminal).42 They were denied the right to build a fifty-five-story office 
tower atop the Terminal under the New York City Landmark Preservation 
Law.43 The Court rejected the plaintiffs’ characterization of the 
denominator as the “air rights” above the Terminal.44 The loss suffered by 
 34. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124. 
 35. In Penn Central, the preservation of landmarks was for the “promotion of the general 
welfare.” Id. at 138. This weighed in favor of the government’s contention that no taking had occurred. 
Id. 
 36. Id. at 124–25. 
 37. Id. at 124 (noting that these criteria require “essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries”). 
 38. Id. at 130–31. 
 39. Marc R. Lisker, Regulatory Takings and the Denominator Problem, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 663, 
664–68 (1996). The denominator problem is as old as regulatory takings themselves; it can be traced 
back to Brandeis’ dissent in Pennsylvania Coal. Penn. Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 419 (1922) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“If we are to consider the value of the coal kept in place by the restriction, 
we should compare it with the value of all other parts of the land. That is, with the value not of the coal 
alone, but with the value of the whole property.”). 
 40. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 130–31. 
 41. See John E. Fee, Unearthing the Denominator in Regulatory Takings Claims, 61 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1535, 1536 (1994); see generally Lisker, supra note 39 (explaining and analyzing the 
denominator problem). 
 42. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 115. 
 43. Id. at 116–17. 
 44. Id. at 130. Note that this characterization would undermine the claim of the plaintiffs in 
Pennsylvania Coal who had lost their “coal rights” under particular property. See supra note 31. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss4/9
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the owners through the deprivation of the right to build atop the Terminal 
(the numerator) could not be considered in relation to discrete segments of 
the property such as the “air rights.”45 Rather, the economic impact was 
determined by the loss in relation to the “parcel as a whole.”46 
Furthermore, the Court noted that the “air rights” above the Terminal were 
transferable to Penn Central’s other properties.47 This meant that the value 
of the Terminal itself coupled with the value of the transferable 
development rights allocated to the Terminal must be considered the 
denominator, rendering the loss of “air rights” above the Terminal minute 
in comparison to the value of the Terminal as a whole.48 
The Penn Central Court also extensively examined the character of the 
government action.49 Justice Brennan initially noted that physical 
appropriations of property constitute the type of “bad” character, which 
might justify finding a taking.50 The character factor did not weigh against 
the government because the New York City law did not physically 
appropriate the plaintiff’s property.51 In its analysis of the character factor, 
the Court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the New York City 
law specifically targeted certain property to the detriment of particular 
landowners.52 Instead, the law comprised a comprehensive plan to 
preserve historic developments53 from which even the plaintiff benefited.54 
 45. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 130. 
 46. Id. at 130–31.  
 47. Id. at 137. 
 48. Id. at 136–37. Some scholars have suggested the “parcel as a whole” approach in this context 
produces a counterintuitive system where what really determines a taking is not the economic loss 
suffered by the plaintiff, but the extent of the plaintiff’s property interest. Daniel R. Mandelker, New 
Property Rights Under the Taking Clause, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 9, 16–17 (1997) (Penn Central provides 
an example of this problem because “[t]he case might have come out differently had the plaintiff been 
the owner of a small railroad station in a rural area who had no other real property assets” rather than a 
major corporation owning several properties.); see also infra note 254. 
 49. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 131–35. 
 50. Id. at 124 (discussing the character of the government action factor, Brennan notes, “A 
‘taking’ may more readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a 
physical invasion by government than when interference arises from some public program adjusting 
the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.” (internal citation omitted)). 
The Court contrasts New York’s purely regulatory historic preservation law with laws physically 
appropriating property. Id. at 135 (citing United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)). Eagle argues 
that Penn Central relegated the character factor to a distinction between physical and regulatory 
takings. See Eagle, supra note 24, at 3. 
 51. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 135 (citing Causby, 328 U.S. 256). Before embarking on the multi-
factor analysis the Penn Central Court noted that New York City pursued the laudable goal of historic 
preservation. Id. at 129. Furthermore, the New York City law constituted a permissible means to reach 
this goal. Id. By so stating that the law’s legitimacy was not in dispute, the Penn Central decision 
implicitly notes that the legitimacy inquiry is separate from the multi-factor Penn Central test. See id. 
 52. Id. at 131. 
Stated baldly, appellants’ position appears to be that the only means of ensuring that selected 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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C. First English: Recognition of a “New” Type of Regulatory Taking, the 
Temporary Regulatory Taking 
Takings jurisprudence took another turn in First English Evangelical 
Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles55 when the Supreme Court 
recognized that even temporary takings are compensable under the Fifth 
Amendment.56 Although the ordinance in First English was in effect less 
than three years,57 the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff could be 
entitled to compensation for economic loss suffered during the 
approximately three-year period.58 Thus, compensation was possible in a 
owners are not singled out to endure financial hardship for no reason is to hold that any 
restriction imposed on individual landmarks pursuant to the New York City scheme is a 
“taking” requiring the payment of “just compensation.” Agreement with this argument would, 
of course, invalidate not just New York City’s law, but all comparable landmark legislation in 
the Nation. We find no merit in it. 
Id. 
 53. Id. at 132. 
In contrast to discriminatory zoning, which is the antithesis of land-use control as part of 
some comprehensive plan, the New York City law embodies a comprehensive plan to 
preserve structures of historic or aesthetic interest wherever they might be found in the city, 
and as noted, over 400 landmarks and 31 historic districts have been designated pursuant to 
this plan. 
Id. 
 54. Id. at 134–35. 
Unless we are to reject the judgment of the New York City Council that the preservation of 
landmarks benefits all New York citizens and all structures, both economically and by 
improving the quality of life in the city as a whole—which we are unwilling to do—we 
cannot conclude that the owners of the Terminal have in no sense been benefited by the 
Landmarks Law. 
Id. 
 55. 482 U.S. 304 (1987). 
 56. Id. at 318–19. Los Angeles County Interim Ordinance No. 11,855 prohibited construction on 
the plaintiff’s property after flooding destroyed the camp previously located on the site. Id. at 307. 
Under the California Supreme Court’s decision in Agins v. Tiburon, 598 P.2d 25 (Cal. 1979), a 
plaintiff could only receive compensation for a regulatory taking if a court first found it 
unconstitutional and the government still chose to enforce the regulation. First English, 482 U.S. at 
308–09. No compensation was required if the government chose to retract the unconstitutional 
ordinance. Id. at 311–12. Thus, under Agins no compensation was possible for “temporary” regulatory 
takings; they were either retracted or made permanent. See id.; see also Berger, supra note 15, at 303 
(according to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in First English, a regulation “is rendered temporary 
only when an ordinance that effects a taking is struck down by a court.” The effect is such that “a 
moratorium—by definition, intended to be temporary—could never result in a taking that would 
require compensation.”). In rejecting the Agins theory, the Supreme Court noted, “‘temporary takings’ 
which, as here, deny a landowner of all use of his property, are not different in kind from permanent 
takings, for which the Constitution clearly requires compensation.” First English, 482 U.S. at 318.  
 57. First English, 482 U.S. at 322; see also Berger, supra note 15, at 322 n.146 (noting the 
Tahoe-Sierra majority erred in its characterization of the duration of the restriction in First English 
because California law limited its length). 
 58. First English, 482 U.S. at 321–22; First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of 
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temporary context.59 However, the lower court deferred the question of 
whether a taking had occurred.60 The Supreme Court remanded for 
determination of whether a taking had in fact occurred under the Penn 
Central analysis.61 
D. Temporary Regulatory Takings May Be Per Se Compensable Under 
the Lucas Categorical Rule 
Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in First English for the 
proposition that temporary takings are compensable,62 the Supreme Court 
in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council63 further determined that 
temporary takings are per se64 entitled to Fifth Amendment compensation 
when they deprive a property owner of “all economically beneficial or 
productive use” of his property.65  
In Lucas, the 1988 South Carolina Beachfront Management Act66 
eliminated the plaintiff’s ability to build single-family homes on his two 
beachfront lots.67 In 1990, after the plaintiff brought suit, the South 
Carolina legislature amended the Beachfront Management Act to allow the 
plaintiff to apply for “special permits” to build.68 The Supreme Court 
found that even though the 1990 amendment provided an allowance for 
“special permits,” which might exempt Lucas’ property from the Act, the 
government had to pay compensation for past losses incurred during the 
three-year temporary taking when the absolute prohibitions set out in the 
Los Angeles, 210 Cal. App.3d 1353, 1373 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (noting length of restriction in First 
English). 
 59. First English, 482 U.S. at 322. 
 60. Id. at 321–22; see also Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 
535 U.S. 302, 328 (2002). 
 61. First English, 482 U.S. at 322. On remand, the district court found that a restriction on 
building lasting more than two years was not unreasonable, and therefore, not a taking. First English, 
210 Cal. App.3d at 1373. 
 62. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 n.17 (1992). 
 63. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
 64. The Supreme Court later rejected a per se application of the Lucas categorical rule. Tahoe-
Sierra, 535 U.S. at 342; Cooley v. United States, 324 F.3d 1297, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (noting that the 
Tahoe-Sierra court held that “no categorical per se taking rule applies to temporary moratoria on land 
development, even though such moratoria may deprive a landowner of all economically viable uses of 
a parcel for a period of time”); see infra notes 90–96 and accompanying text. 
 65. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019; see also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 900 (S.C. 
1991), rev’d, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (noting the difference between the Mugler emphasis on the 
importance of the government action and the Pennsylvania Coal emphasis on limiting government 
action).  
 66. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-10 et seq. (Law. Co-op. 1987). 
 67. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1008–09. 
 68. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-290 et seq. (Law. Co-op. 1991). 
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original 1988 Act were in effect.69 It was unnecessary to consider the 
character of the government action or the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s 
interest because the lower court found that the plaintiff’s property lost all 
economic value under the 1988 Act.70 Thus, the Lucas categorical rule 
provided a property owner with compensation without requiring an 
evaluation of the Penn Central ad hoc factual inquiries so long as the 
property owner instead showed that he had been deprived of “all 
economically beneficial or productive use” of the property.71  
II. TAHOE-SIERRA 
Even before the plaintiffs in First English and Lucas suffered from 
alleged takings, the litigation that would eventually undermine their 
holdings was already in motion.72 Justice Stevens’73 opinion in Tahoe-
Sierra marked the culmination of almost twenty years of litigation74 
between the plaintiffs, approximately 700 property owners in the Lake 
Tahoe region,75 and the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA).76 
 69. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1011, 1030. 
 70. Id. at 1016 n.7, 1017. Notably, the Supreme Court avoided an independent analysis of 
whether such a complete deprivation actually took place under the facts in Lucas by deferring to the 
trial court’s judgment. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 330–31. The trial court found that the 1988 Act 
rendered the plaintiff’s fee simple interest in his two beachfront lots “valueless.” Lucas, 505 U.S. at 
1007. Thus, the majority avoided the denominator problem entirely. In contrast, Justice Stevens’ 
dissent labels the denominator problem as the dispositive question. Id. at 1054 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“The same regulation can always be characterized as a mere ‘partial’ withdrawal from full, 
unencumbered ownership of the landholding affected by the regulation. . . .” (quoting Frank 
Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1614 (1988))).  
 71. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015. Justice Stevens’ dissent criticizes the equity of the Lucas categorical 
rule, which would allow a landowner losing 100% of the economic value of his property to recover per 
se, but denying a landowner who lost 95% of the economic value of his property to recover per se. Id. 
at 1064. This hypothetical analysis has largely come true. See infra notes 119, 193–95 and 
accompanying text. 
 72. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 808 F. Supp. 1484, 
1486–87 (D. Nev. 1992) (outlining the timeline of the Tahoe-Sierra lower court decisions against the 
back drop of the Supreme Court’s decisions in First English and Lucas). Before First English was 
decided in 1987, the Tahoe-Sierra plaintiffs’ claims had already made their first run through the 
California and Nevada district courts. Id. Just after Lucas was decided in 1992, the District Court of 
Nevada granted the Tahoe-Sierra defendants’ motion to dismiss all claims, finding even the Lucas 
categorical rule unpersuasive. Id. at 1491–92. 
 73. For an analysis of the changes in the Supreme Court that elevated Justice Stevens’ views on 
takings from the dissent in Lucas to the majority in Tahoe-Sierra see generally Lazarus, supra note 17. 
 74. The Tahoe-Sierra plaintiffs originally brought suit in 1984 and made four trips to the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit before Tahoe-Sierra. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe 
Reg’l Planning Agency, 322 F.3d 1064, 1074–75 (9th Cir. 2003). Their efforts officially ended with 
the dismissal of their takings claim under the 1987 Plan on res judicata grounds in 2003. Id. at 1076–
86. 
 75. J. David Breemer, Temporary Insanity: The Long Tale of Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council 
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A. Factual and Procedural Background 
To preserve the clarity and color of Lake Tahoe, California and Nevada 
entered into the 1980 Tahoe Regional Planning Compact (Compact).77 The 
Compact set environmental standards and authorized the TRPA to adopt a 
permanent regional plan to meet those standards.78 
In the course of TRPA’s efforts to halt the erosive impact of 
development prior to the adoption of the permanent regional plan, TRPA 
enacted two consecutive moratoria beginning in 1981 and ending thirty-
two months later.79 Despite the fact that the prohibitions on development 
created by the moratoria continued beyond their 1984 termination, the 
Tahoe-Sierra majority80 considered only the thirty-two month prohibition 
on building between 1981 and 1983.81  
and its Quiet Ending in the United States Supreme Court, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 8–17 (2002) 
(containing a detailed account of factual and procedural history of Tahoe-Sierra).  
 76. TRPA was created in 1968 under the Tahoe Regional Planning Compact in order to carry out 
California and Nevada’s aspirations under that agreement. Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, Pub. L. 
No. 91–148, 83 Stat. 360 (1969). 
 77. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 308 (2002). 
The development of the Lake Tahoe region increased erosion, which in turn began diminishing the 
clarity of the unique blue lake. Id. In particular, impervious surfaces such as pavement collect rainfall, 
maximizing the erosive impact of the water. Id. at 308.  
 78. Id. at 310–11. 
 79. Id. at 311–12. The first of these moratoria, Ordinance 81-5, occurred in 1981 and was 
followed in 1983 by Resolution 83-21. Id. Ordinance 81-5 banned all construction in certain high-
hazard areas in California for two years. Id. High hazard areas included those areas with steeper slopes 
that might produce more run-off and those areas around wetlands. Id. at 309. Ordinance 81-5 
prohibited development in these high hazard areas for two years, the projected amount of time 
necessary for the adoption of a permanent plan. Id. However, TRPA failed to enact a permanent plan 
in that two-year period. Id. Resolution 83-21 banned all development in both California and Nevada 
until a permanent plan was adopted in 1984. Id. 
 80. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissent proposes that the 1984 Plan should have been considered in 
the analysis of whether or not a taking had occurred. Id. at 345–46 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Thus, 
the period of time under consideration should have begun with the implementation of Resolution 81-3 
in 1981 and ended six years later with the adoption of the 1987 Plan. Id. at 346; see also Berger, supra 
note 15, at 303 (noting that the 1984 and 1987 plans merely continued the prohibitions of earlier the 
moratoria). Chief Justice Rehnquist notes that the Tahoe-Sierra plaintiffs were denied just as much, if 
not more, of the economically beneficial use of their land as the Lucas plaintiff, considering the six 
year duration of the taking in Tahoe-Sierra as opposed to the two year duration in Lucas. Tahoe-
Sierra, 535 U.S. at 347 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 81. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 312. The 1984 Plan itself did not result in the continuation of the 
stringent building restrictions imposed by Resolution 83-21 and Ordinance 81-5. Id. Rather, the 
relatively lax provisions of the 1984 Plan prompted the State of California to sue to enjoin the plan 
immediately upon implementation. Id. After the adoption of the 1984 Plan, the State of California filed 
suit to enjoin its implementation because the land-use restrictions of the 1984 Plan did not sufficiently 
protect Lake Tahoe. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 34 F. Supp. 2d 
1226, 1236 (D. Nev. 1999). The resulting injunction, which lasted until implementing the 1987 Plan, 
continued the restrictions set out in the earlier moratoria. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 312. The 
permanent plan adopted in 1987 contained the same restrictions against building found in Ordinance 
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The plaintiffs brought both as-applied and facial challenges82 to the two 
moratoria alleging that they constituted takings under both the Penn 
Central and Lucas tests.83 After weighing the Penn Central factors, the 
district court found that there was no taking under Penn Central due to the 
temporary nature of the regulations.84 However, the district court did find 
that the thirty-two month prohibition on development constituted a 
categorical temporary taking under the Lucas analysis because the 
plaintiffs were effectively denied “all economically viable use” during the 
moratoria.85 
81-5 and Resolution 83-21. Id. at 312. 
 The majority approved the Ninth Circuit’s finding that TRPA did not “cause” the injunction, but 
rather the suit by the State of California caused the injunction. Id. at 313. In contrast, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist found that TRPA was the “moving force” behind the injunction; TRPA’s construction of a 
1984 Plan that did not comply with the 1980 Tahoe Regional Planning Compact “caused” the suit and 
ensuing injunction. Id. at 345 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see supra note 80. 
 82. When bringing a facial takings claim, a plaintiff proposes that the regulation or statute itself 
constitutes a taking. E.g., NJD, Ltd. v. City of San Dimas, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 818, 825–26 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2003) (finding evidence of adverse economic impact on the plaintiff not admissible when the plaintiff 
brought a facial challenge because a facial taking occurs only when the mere enactment of the 
regulation constitutes a taking); see also St. Amand & Merriam, supra note 12, at 928 (stating when a 
facial taking exists, “no matter how the regulation is applied to any property, in every instance it would 
work a taking of that property . . .”). Facial challenges to land-use restrictions, like the one brought in 
Tahoe-Sierra, are “highly unusual—not totally a matter of fantasy, like a jackalope, but something 
akin to a nearly extinct species, such as an Asiatic cheetah.” Id. (footnote omitted). 
 In contrast to facial takings claims, as-applied takings claims require the court to examine the ad 
hoc factual inquiries laid out in Penn Central as they apply to the plaintiff’s particular property. Id. at 
927–28. 
 83. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 317. Intuitively, the Penn Central and Lucas tests can be used in 
both as-applied and facial challenges. A plaintiff could prevail on an as-applied Penn Central basis by 
demonstrating that a balancing of the three criteria regarding a specific parcel constitutes a taking. 
E.g., Friedenberg v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, 767 N.Y.S.2d 451, 461 (App. Div. 
2003). A Penn Central facial claim would require that the plaintiff show that the regulation on its face 
constitutes a taking under the Penn Central criteria for any property. E.g., Comm. for Reasonable 
Regulation v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 311 F. Supp. 2d 972, 993 (D. Nev. 2004). An as-applied 
Lucas basis for recovery would require a plaintiff to show that under the particular circumstances a 
complete economic loss was suffered. A Lucas facial claim requires a showing that the regulation on 
its face strips a landowner of all economically beneficial use. E.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 
U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992). Despite the theoretical possibility of all four approaches, the Penn Central 
factors are typically used in as-applied claims while Lucas is used for facial claims.  
 84. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 315; Tahoe-Sierra, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1240 (finding that the 
landowner had no reasonable expectation to build on the lots during the moratoria because the average 
holding time of a lot in the area was twenty-five years). 
 85. Tahoe-Sierra, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1245. The land retained some value despite the moratoria. 
Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 316 n.12. Between the initiation of the moratoria and the enactment of the 
1984 Plan, the United States Forest Service purchased over 382 parcels in California and 72 parcels in 
Nevada. Id. The average prices in California and Nevada before August 26, 1983 were over $19,000 
and $39,000 respectively. Id. 
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The appeal concerned only the categorical takings finding.86 The Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s finding87 that the 
plaintiffs had been denied “all economically viable use.”88 In a 6–3 
decision, the Supreme Court upheld the Ninth Circuit.89 
B. The Supreme Court Majority 
1. Temporal Divisions of Property 
In affirming the Ninth Circuit’s application of the denominator 
problem, the Supreme Court majority90 rejected temporal divisions of 
property.91 The Court required that intense scrutiny be applied to moratoria 
of more than one year in length. Like the moratoria in Tahoe-Sierra, these 
moratoria could not be considered in temporal isolation.92 Instead of 
temporally dividing the plaintiffs’ property interests such that the value of 
the properties during the thirty-two month period of the moratoria 
comprised the denominator, the Court considered the value of the whole 
interminable fee simple estate as the denominator.93 The loss in value over 
the thirty-two month moratoria (the numerator) was not significant in 
relation to the entirety of the fee simple estates (the denominator).94 At the 
very least, the properties certainly did not lose all value.95 The Lucas 
categorical takings test was inappropriately applied by the district court 
because the plaintiffs could not make the prerequisite showing that the 
 86. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 317 (noting “that petitioners had expressly disavowed an argument 
‘that the regulations constitute a taking under the ad hoc balancing approach described in Penn 
Central’” (quoting Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764, 
773 (9th Cir. 2000), aff’d, Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. 302 (2002))).  
 87. Tahoe-Sierra, 216 F.3d at 789. 
 88. Tahoe-Sierra, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1245. The Ninth Circuit noted that the district court 
incorrectly determined that the denominator was the value of the properties during the thirty-two 
months of the moratoria. Tahoe-Sierra, 216 F.3d at 774. Rather, the denominator should have been the 
value of the property for the duration of the fee simple estates held by the plaintiffs. See id. 
 89. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 343. 
 90. Justices Thomas and Scalia joined in Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissent. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 
U.S. at 343 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Justice Thomas also wrote separately to protest the majority’s 
rejection of temporal divisions of property for the purpose of determining the denominator in takings 
claims. Id. at 355 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see supra note 80. 
 91. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 319, 331–32; see also Tahoe-Sierra, 216 F.3d at 776. Spatial and 
use-based divisions of property were also rejected. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 319, 331–32. 
 92. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 341. 
 93. Id. at 331–32. By definition, a fee simple estate lasts indefinitely. A fee simple interest in 
property is an absolute interest with infinite duration. 28 AM. JUR. 2D Estates § 13 (2004); e.g., Scott 
v. Brunson, 569 S.E.2d 385, 387 (S.C. Ct. App. 2002). 
 94. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 331–32. 
 95. Id. 
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thirty-two month moratoria deprived them of “all” beneficial use of their 
property.96  
The Supreme Court majority97 distinguished the facts in both First 
English98 and Lucas99 from those in Tahoe-Sierra because in both those 
cases the Court had not actually decided the merits of the takings 
claims.100 
 96. Id. at 330. 
 97. In his dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist argues that the majority’s rationale for distinguishing 
the two former decisions establishes inequitable treatment of similar takings depending on whether the 
land use restriction is labeled “temporary” or “permanent.” Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 346–47 
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). A plaintiff could recover under the Lucas per se rule for a two year 
prohibition on land use so long as the regulation is labeled “permanent,” but another landowner could 
not recover for a six year prohibition on land use if the regulation is labeled “temporary.” Id. at 345, 
347 (noting that the prohibition in Tahoe-Sierra really lasted six years); see supra note 80. Chief 
Justice Rehnquist notes that no land use regulations are irrevocable. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 345, 
347. Thus, even a regulation labeled permanent, like the statutory prohibition in Lucas, can later be 
modified or repealed. Id. 
 Rather than granting compensation based on an artificial linguistic division between temporary 
and permanent land use restrictions, Chief Justice Rehnquist proposes granting compensation based on 
the nature of the regulation. Id. at 351–52. For example, those normal delays resulting from acquiring 
building permits and changing zoning ordinances, as first outlined in First English, would not be 
takings. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 321 
(1987); Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 351 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“When a regulation merely delays 
a final land-use decision, we have recognized that there are other background principles of state 
property law that prevent the delay from being deemed a taking.”). The Tahoe-Sierra moratoria do not 
fall into this protected category for two reasons. First, the thirty-two month moratoria in Tahoe-Sierra 
stripped the landowners of all use rather than merely prohibiting use for particular activities. Tahoe-
Sierra, 535 U.S. at 352–53 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (noting the permissibility of restrictions that 
prohibit certain categories of use, such as fast-food restaurants, adult stores, and commercial 
development). Second, unlike the typical permissible moratoria outlined in First English, the Tahoe-
Sierra moratoria were of extraordinary length. Id. at 353–54; see supra note 80. 
 98. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 328 (distinguishing First English). 
 99. Id. at 330–31 (distinguishing Lucas). 
 100. Id. at 328. The court rejected the plaintiff’s reliance on First English because the Supreme 
Court had considered only the merits of a remedial question and not whether a taking had occurred. 
Id.; see supra notes 55–61 and accompanying text. 
 In distinguishing Lucas, the Court noted that the Lucas plaintiff protested a permanent statute, 
unlike the Tahoe-Sierra plaintiffs who protested a pair of temporary moratoria. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 
U.S. at 330–31. In Lucas, it was not until after the suit was filed that the statute was amended. Id. 
Thus, the Lucas claim had been founded on a permanent, rather than a temporary takings theory. Id. In 
Lucas, like First English, the Supreme Court had not considered the merits of a temporary takings 
claim. Id.; see also supra notes 62–71 and accompanying text. Accordingly, the district court in 
Tahoe-Sierra incorrectly applied the categorical Lucas test, which requires a showing that the 
government deprived the property owner of “all” economically beneficial use. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 
U.S. at 330. Instead, the district court measured the thirty-two month loss in value against the value of 
the fee simple estates over time. Id. 
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2. The Penn Central Factors Reaffirmed 
The Court noted a strong prejudice against per se rules101 in regulatory 
takings jurisprudence: if regulatory takings required compensation per se, 
land use regulations would become an unaffordable luxury for 
governments.102 To avoid costly compensation even for temporary 
regulations, governments would be prone to make hasty decisions 
regarding long-term land use questions.103 Therefore, the Court limited the 
Lucas categorical rule to only those “relatively rare” situations in which 
the government strips a landowner of all economically beneficial use.104 
Because a temporary taking can never meet the prerequisite showing of a 
loss of “all economically beneficial or productive use” under the “parcel as 
a whole” approach,105 the Lucas categorical rule never applies to non-
physical temporary regulatory takings.106 Rather, the Supreme Court 
reasoned that courts should look to the Penn Central factors to determine 
whether a temporary restriction on land use constitutes a taking.107 
In dicta, the Supreme Court outlined six arguments that might provide 
grounds for finding a taking in Tahoe-Sierra based on fairness and 
justice.108 One of these alternate approaches suggested that the series of 
 101. See generally MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW, supra note 12, § 2.03 (explaining the Lucas per 
se rule).  
 102. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 324. This echoes the emphasis on the importance of regulation in 
Justice Harlan’s 1878 opinion in Mugler. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668 (1887); see also supra 
note 27 and accompanying text. 
 103. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 335. The Court noted that application of per se rules should be 
limited to those “extraordinary case[s]” in which the government physically appropriates property or in 
which a regulatory taking is so extreme, as in Lucas, that it deprives the owner of “all” beneficial use 
of the property. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 332; Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 
U.S. 419, 422 (1982) (providing an example of a physical temporary taking when a per se rule would 
be appropriate). 
 104. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 319, 337–38. Even a 95% diminution in value cannot compel 
application of the Lucas rule. Id. at 330 (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019, 
n.8 (1992)); Friedenberg v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, 767 N.Y.S.2d 451, 458–59 (App. 
Div. 2003) (finding even a 95% diminution in the property value of the plaintiff’s beachfront lot from 
$665,000 to $31,500 insufficient for the application of Lucas per se rule). 
 105. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 332. Accordingly, the Lucas test was rejected for all temporary 
takings involving fee simple interests. Id. (“Hence, a permanent deprivation of the owner’s use of the 
entire area is a taking of ‘the parcel as a whole,’ whereas a temporary restriction that merely causes a 
diminution in value is not.”). 
 106. See id. at 335. 
 107. Id. The Court noted that the duration of the regulation is not immaterial; duration plays a role 
in determining the outcome under the Penn Central factors. Id. (citing Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 
U.S. 606, 636 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring)).  
 108. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 333–34. In addition to declining to extend the Lucas per se rule to 
temporary takings, the Court also rejected two other possible per se rules that might provide bright line 
grounds for compensation based on the nature or the duration of regulations. Id. The second per se rule 
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moratoria in Tahoe-Sierra comprised “rolling moratoria” that were the 
functional equivalent of a permanent taking.109 However, according to the 
Court in Tahoe-Sierra, fairness and justice110 did not require the adoption 
of any of these rationales.111 
III. REGULATORY TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE AFTER TAHOE-SIERRA 
A. General Takings Trends: The Failure of Categorical and Facial 
Takings Claims 
Since Tahoe-Sierra, both federal and state courts have dealt with 
numerous takings claims. The spectrum ranges from regulatory claims 
involving land use restrictions112 to physical appropriation claims 
declined by the Supreme Court would have made all land use regulations, even temporary ones, per se 
illegal. Id. However, there would be an exception for those regulations resulting in “normal delays” 
caused by common building and zoning measures. Id. (outlining “a narrower rule [than that in Lucas] 
that would cover all temporary land-use restrictions except those ‘normal delays in obtaining building 
permits, changes in zoning ordinances, variances, and the like’” (quoting First English Evangelical 
Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987))). In addition to the common 
pitfalls of per se rules in making land use restrictions an unaffordable luxury, this rule would require 
courts to distinguish between permissible “normal delays” and impermissible atypical delays. The 
distinction might make many formerly permissible exercises of police power compensable takings, 
thus crippling governments. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 335. 
 The Court also outlined four potential non-per se grounds for compensation. Id. at 333–34; see 
infra note 109 and accompanying text.  
 109. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 333–34. First, the Court declined to apply the “rolling moratoria” 
theory to the facts in Tahoe-Sierra because it had not been addressed by the district court or the court 
of appeals. Id. The “rolling moratoria” theory was not considered because the order granting certiorari 
did not encompass that issue. Id. at 334; see also Berger, supra note 15, at 303. Additionally, the 
Supreme Court noted that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the moratoria as separate 
takings. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 334.  
 Second, a showing that the government acted in bad faith might entitle plaintiffs to compensation. 
Id. at 333. However, the Supreme Court deferred to the district court’s finding that there was no bad 
faith involved in Tahoe-Sierra. Id. 
 Third, if the government regulations did not substantially promote a legitimate state interest, 
compensation would be required. Id. at 333–34. This theory of compensation, like the bad faith theory, 
was precluded by the undisputed factual findings of the district court. Id. 
 Fourth, rather than making a facial challenge, the individual plaintiffs might have alleged that a 
taking occurred with respect to the regulations “as applied” to their specific parcels under the Penn 
Central factors. Id. at 334. The Court speculated that at least some of the plaintiffs in Tahoe-Sierra 
would have prevailed had they brought an “as applied” takings claim in this case. Id. 
 Due to the scope of the Supreme Court’s review and the uncontested factual findings of the 
district court, none of these four non-per se alternatives served as a possible justification for 
compensation in Tahoe-Sierra. Id. 
 110. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 333. The notion of fairness and justice as the overarching themes 
underlying takings jurisprudence comes from the serially cited Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 
40, 49 (1960); see also supra notes 3, 30 and accompanying text. 
 111. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 334–35. 
 112. E.g., D.A.B.E., Inc. v. City of Toledo, 393 F.3d 692, 695–96 (6th Cir. 2005) (rejecting facial 
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involving personal property.113 Courts have uniformly rejected temporal 
segmentation in federal constitutional claims in all contexts.114 Even in 
vertical (use-based) and horizontal (spatial) segmentation cases, the 
“parcel as a whole” method of resolving the denominator problem has 
played a prominent role in post-Tahoe-Sierra takings analysis.115  
takings challenge to city ordinance limiting smoking); NJD, Ltd. v. City of San Dimas, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
818, 834–35 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (evaluating the constitutionality of zoning restrictions); see also 
Machipongo Land & Coal Co. v. Commonwealth, 799 A.2d 751, 769 (Pa. 2002) (evaluating the 
constitutionality of regulations governing the use of certain property for coal mining). 
 113. E.g., Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 240–41 (2003) (rejecting plaintiff’s per 
se takings claim that the government physically appropriated interest on attorneys’ trust accounts). 
 114. Santini v. Conn. Hazardous Waste Mgmt. Serv., 342 F.3d 118, 131 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(concluding a nuclear waste facility site proposal later withdrawn was temporary and due to the 
temporary nature of the site proposal, not all value was lost and no taking occurred); Maritrans, Inc. v. 
United States, 342 F.3d 1344, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (rejecting temporal segmentation of the post-
regulation period and requiring that the pre-regulation profits derived from the plaintiffs’ barges be 
included in the denominator); Berst v. Snohomish County, 57 P.3d 273, 279 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) 
(finding six year moratorium on development not a Lucas per se taking because of its temporary 
nature). 
 115. Appolo Fuels, Inc. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1338, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (noting that the 
relevant parcel for purposes of a takings evaluation consists not merely of land affected by mining 
restrictions, but the entirety of the plaintiff’s leaseholds); Norman v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 231, 
257–58, 261 (Fed. Cl. 2004) (rejecting horizontal segmentation of 220.85 acres of wetlands from 2,280 
acre development); Vellequette v. Town of Woodside, No. A091682, 2002 WL 1614358, at *1, **11–
12 (Cal. Ct. App. July 23, 2002) (refusing to allow spatial segmentation of the plaintiffs’ three lots for 
purposes of determining the denominator); LaSalle Nat’l Bank v. City of Highland Park, 799 N.E.2d 
781, 791–94 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (considering three lots together under the Penn Central “parcel as a 
whole” rule); Zanghi v. Bd. of Appeals of Bedford, 807 N.E.2d 221, 224, 227–28 (Mass. App. Ct. 
2004) (considering the values of lots 33 and 34 as part of the same parcel as non-continguous lot 36); 
Machipongo, 799 A.2d at 769 (declining both use-based and spatial segmentation of Machipongo and 
Naughton/Erickson properties even though the plaintiffs held only a coal interest in some of the 
properties and some properties were not entirely contiguous). Contra State ex rel. R.T.G., Inc. v. State, 
780 N.E.2d 998, 1008–09 (Ohio 2002) (allowing vertical use-based segmentation such that coal rights 
alone comprise the denominator for coal property held in fee). 
 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s decision in Machipongo Land & Coal Co. v. 
Commonwealth demonstrates how Tahoe-Sierra’s reaffirmation of the “parcel as a whole” has 
supported the rejection of segmentation in both vertical and horizontal contexts. Machipongo, 799 
A.2d at 769. Portions of the Machipongo fee simple and coal estates were designated Unfit for Mining 
(UFM) in 1992 in order to prevent water pollution in the Goss Run Watershed. Id. at 755–56. The 
Naughton/Erickson property included coal estates declared UFM and fee simple estates outside the 
UFM area. Id. at 756. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reaffirmed the importance of the denominator 
problem in the wake of Tahoe-Sierra by refusing to sever the coal estates from either the fee simple 
interests (use-based severance) or the noncontiguous properties (spatial severance) from one another. 
Machipongo, 799 A.2d at 768–69; see generally, Matthew J. Bauer, Note, Absent Physical Invasion, 
Government Interference with Private Property Will not Likely Violate the Fifth Amendment’s Takings 
Clause: Machipongo Land and Coal Company, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 41 DUQ. L. 
REV. 619 (2003) (discussing Machipongo as illustrative of the obstacles to bringing a successful 
regulatory takings claim). Additionally, the Court of Federal Claims recently held that even non-
contiguous properties sometimes compose part of the relevant parcel so long as they are part of “a 
common development plan.” See Cane Tenn. Inc. v. United States, 60 Fed. Cl. 694, 703 (Fed. Cl. 
2004). 
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Despite the Supreme Court’s admonishments regarding the Lucas per 
se rule, many plaintiffs have continued to bring Lucas claims in the wake 
of Tahoe-Sierra.116 After ritualistically citing Tahoe-Sierra’s reaffirmation 
of Penn Central, the courts have typically found no Lucas taking.117 In 
possibly the most extreme example, the Federal Circuit rejected a Lucas 
claim in Cooley v. United States118 because wetland property that 
decreased in value 98.8% still had not lost all economically viable use.119 
Not only does post-Tahoe-Sierra jurisprudence abound with examples of 
failed Lucas claims, but there are also a plethora of examples of failed 
facial takings claims.120 However, in a few cases since Tahoe-Sierra 
plaintiffs have prevailed on regulatory takings claims.121 
 116. See infra notes 117–19 and accompanying text. 
 117. In most instances, the Lucas categorical claims have failed in the wake of Tahoe-Sierra. 
Santini, 342 F.3d at 131 (holding Lucas inapplicable when restriction temporary); Maritrans, 342 F.3d 
at 1354–55 (holding that a regulation requiring the plaintiff to retire or retrofit its existing single-hulled 
oil barges to make them double-hulled did not deprive the plaintiff of the entire useful life of the 
barges under Lucas); Cane Tenn. Inc. v. United States, 57 Fed. Cl. 115, 130 (Fed. Cl. 2003) (holding 
Lucas inapplicable in the absence of “total loss” of the value of Colton’s property); Cane Tenn. Inc. v. 
United States, 54 Fed. Cl. 100, 108 (Fed. Cl. 2002) (determining that the Lucas test was inappropriate 
because the Cane property did not lose all value); NJD, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 835 (finding plaintiff failed 
to make an adequate showing for a categorical claim); Vellequette, 2002 WL 1614358, at *10 (finding 
plaintiff failed to show a loss of all economic use under Lucas when sewer ordinance prevented 
separate development on each of three adjacent lots); Leon County v. Gluesenkamp, 873 So.2d 460, 
461, 466–68 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (reversing the trial court’s $130,000 judgment on the plaintiff’s 
Lucas claim because plaintiff’s sale of the lots for over $1 million showed that there was no depletion 
of all economic use); Zanghi, 807 N.E.2d at 224–25 (rejecting a Lucas claim because the plaintiff did 
not lose all economic use of the “entire parcel,” which consisted of all the lots purchased by the 
plaintiff through a single deed rather than the sole lot on which construction was prohibited); 
Machipongo, 799 A.2d at 769 (finding Lucas inapplicable because plaintiffs did not suffer complete 
deprivation of economically beneficial use of their properties); Berst, 57 P.3d at 279 (holding Lucas 
and First English not applicable in takings claim after Tahoe-Sierra). 
 118. 324 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 119. Id. at 1304–06 (vacating and remanding the Court of Federal Claims’ finding of a Lucas 
categorical taking when a wetland permit denial deprived plaintiff of 98.8% of the value of his 
property). 
 120. E.g., Hotel & Motel Ass’n v. City of Oakland, 344 F.3d 959, 963, 966 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(rebuking facial taking claim against city regarding habitability ordinances for hotels); see also Lost 
Tree Vill. Corp. v. City of Vero Beach, 838 So.2d 561, 564, 572 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (finding no 
facial taking even though a city ordinance prohibiting certain locations for bridgeheads, coupled with a 
town ordinance prohibiting development without bridges, severely restricted potential development of 
plaintiff’s island property); see also Machipongo, 799 A.2d at 758 (affirming lower court’s finding 
that facial claim was invalid); NJD, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 834–35 (finding insufficient showing that 
development moratorium comprised a facial taking). 
 121. E.g., Cienega Gardens v. United States, 331 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2003). In Cienega Gardens, 
the Federal Circuit found that the plaintiffs suffered a regulatory taking. Id. at 1353. The Emergency 
Low Income Housing Preservation Act (ELIHPA) and Low-Income Housing Preservation and 
Resident Homeownership Act (LIHPRHA) revoked the ability of the plaintiffs to pre-pay their 
mortgages after twenty years as formerly agreed. Id. at 1325–26. The Federal Circuit found that 
ELIHPA and LIHPRHA could constitute regulatory takings under the Penn Central factors. Id. at 
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B. The Penn Central Factors After Tahoe-Sierra 
In Tahoe-Sierra, the Supreme Court mandated that courts look to the 
Penn Central factors for guidance.122 Accordingly, courts consider the 
three Penn Central factors in turn: (1) the property-owner’s reasonable 
investment-backed expectations; (2) the regulation’s economic impact on 
the property owner; and (3) the character of the government action.123 The 
following cases illustrate some of the post-Tahoe-Sierra trends in applying 
the Penn Central factors.124 
1. The Economic Impact on the Property Owner 
In the following two cases, the economic impact factor provided the 
focal point in the court’s takings analysis. 
Like many regulatory takings decisions,125 Bass Enterprise Production 
Co. v. United States has a complex procedural background.126 The Bass 
plaintiffs held a lease for oil rights127 in property that was located near the 
1337–53. Likewise, in SDDS, Inc. v. State of South Dakota, the Supreme Court of South Dakota 
declined to reconsider whether a temporary taking had in fact occurred after Tahoe-Sierra. 650 
N.W.2d 1, 25 (S.D. 2002). While this suggests that the outcome might favor the defendant after 
Tahoe-Sierra, the plaintiff prevailed due to the court’s refusal to reconsider the takings claim. Id. at 10 
(taking occurred when regulation denied plaintiff the ability to build a solid waste treatment facility). 
 122. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 326–27 
(2002). 
 123. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
 124. While Tahoe-Sierra redefined the perimeters of regulatory takings, it had little effect on the 
first Penn Central factor, the plaintiff’s reasonable investment-backed expectations. 
 125. See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. 302; see generally Breemer, supra note 75 (detailing the 
long and complicated procedural history of the Tahoe-Sierra litigation). 
 126. In 1996, the Court of Federal Claims found that the government had permanently taken the 
plaintiff’s leasehold interest. Bass Enters. Prod. Co. v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 615, 617, 620 (Fed. 
Cl. 1996). The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that no permanent taking had occurred and remanded 
for a determination as to whether a temporary taking had occurred. Bass Enters. Prod. Co. v. United 
States, 133 F.3d 893, 894 (Fed. Cir. 1998). In 1999, the Federal Claims Court found that a taking had 
occurred under Penn Central and then in 2002 granted the defendant’s motion for rehearing after 
Tahoe-Sierra. Bass Enters. Prod. Co. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1360, 1363–64 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(detailing the history of the Bass litigation). In 2004, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Court of Federal 
Claims’ post-Tahoe-Sierra decision. Id. at 1371. 
 127. Restrictions on mining and other mineral extraction activity continually find their way to 
courts. For example, the Kohler Act, which restricted mining, provided the catalyst for the first 
regulatory taking in Pennsylvania Coal. Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 412–13 (1922). A 
similar restriction was unsuccessfully challenged in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis 
and even more recently in Machipongo Land & Coal Co. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Keystone 
Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 476–77 (1987); Machipongo Land & Coal Co. 
v. Commonwealth, 799 A.2d 751, 769 (Pa. 2002). Bass and Cane provide further examples. See infra 
notes 128–63 and accompanying text; see also Michael Graf, Application of Takings Law to the 
Regulation of Unpatented Mining Claims, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 57, 77–78 (1997) (reviewing takings 
jurisprudence in the mining context). 
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future site of a nuclear waste storage facility.128 They were denied a permit 
to drill for oil for four years because of the property’s proximity to the 
site.129 In 1999, after years of litigation, the Court of Federal Claims 
determined that a temporary taking had occurred under the Lucas per se 
rule.130 In the wake of Tahoe-Sierra the court granted the government’s 
motion for reconsideration and reversed the 1999 pre-Tahoe-Sierra 
finding.131  
In 1999, the Court of Federal Claims found that the plaintiff suffered a 
Lucas categorical taking during the four-year period in which they could 
not drill oil on their leasehold.132 In 2002, the same court found that the 
Lucas rule was inappropriately applied to the plaintiff’s case.133 In 
particular, the court noted that public policy considerations precluded the 
application of the Lucas test in both Tahoe-Sierra and Bass.134 
In 1996, the Court of Federal Claims evaluated the facts of Bass under 
the Penn Central factors to determine whether a permanent taking had 
occurred.135 The determinative Penn Central factor in Bass was the 
economic impact on the property owner.136 With regard to the economic 
 128. Bass Enters., 35 Fed. Cl. at 616. 
 129. Id.; Bass Enters., 54 Fed. Cl. at 402. The plaintiff’s lease would not be affected by the facility 
unless the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) determined that it must acquire the lease to 
comply with a federal statute. Bass Enters., 35 Fed. Cl. at 616. Before the EPA set these standards, the 
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) denied plaintiff’s applications to drill for oil for four years. Id.; 
Bass Enters., 54 Fed. Cl. at 402. Only after the plaintiff brought a takings claim did the BLM contend 
that the denial was merely a delay pending action from the EPA and the Department Of Energy. Bass 
Enters., 35 Fed. Cl. at 616–17. 
 130. Bass Enters. Prod. Co. v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 120, 123 (Fed. Cl. 1999), reh’g granted 
and rev’d, 54 Fed. Cl. 400, 401 (Fed. Cl. 2002). 
 131. Bass Enters., 54 Fed. Cl. at 401, aff’d, Bass Enters., 381 F.3d at 1371. 
 132. Bass Enters., 45 Fed. Cl. at 123, reh’g granted and rev’d, 54 Fed. Cl. at 402 (the BLM 
accepted plaintiffs applications to drill oil in May of 1998). In the 1999 decision the court noted that 
the denial of the plaintiff’s applications for four years constituted an absolute loss to the plaintiff 
during that time. Bass Enters., 45 Fed. Cl. at 124. The court reasoned that even the eventual 
capitulation of the BLM could not compensate the plaintiff for the lost years of use. Id. at 123. Relying 
on First English, the court noted that it was “well established” that temporary takings require 
compensation just as permanent takings require compensation. Id. (quoting Kennedy’s concurrence in 
Lucas, which in turn cited First English). 
 133. Bass Enters., 54 Fed. Cl. at 401. 
 134. Id. at 404. The court recognized that the application of the Lucas rule in either case might 
constrain government agencies by forcing them to rush through important planning decisions in order 
to avoid costly Fifth Amendment compensation. Id. 
 135. Bass Enters. Prod. Co. v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 615, 618–20 (Fed. Cl. 1996), rev’d, 133 
F.3d 893, 894 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 136. The 1996 Bass court considered both the reasonable investment-backed expectations and the 
character of the government action. Id. at 619–20. In the 1996 case, the court noted that plaintiffs had 
reasonable investment-backed expectations although regulatory restrictions had restrained certain 
activities even in 1952 when the plaintiffs acquired the lease. Id. at 620. The court reasoned that the 
Lucas decision changed the inquiry as to the character of the government action. Id. Unless the 
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impact factor, the court noted that the denial of the right to mine stripped 
the plaintiffs of all the economically beneficial use of their leasehold 
interest.137 Because the lease was for oil and gas rights only, a denial of 
these uses was a denial of 100% of the property’s value.138 
After considering the Penn Central factors again in 2002, the same 
court found that no temporary taking had occurred under the same facts.139 
As in 1996, the court considered the economic impact on the plaintiff.140 
The court previously determined that the economic impact of the four year 
permit denial was $1,137,808.141 This was minor in relation to the $22.5 
million value of the plaintiff’s leasehold beyond the four year period.142 
Under the “parcel as a whole” framework set out in Tahoe-Sierra, this loss 
was just 5% of the total value.143 The court found that the importance of 
the public welfare interest protected by the government’s action,144 
combined with the minimal relative economic impact of the permit denial, 
outweighed the reasonable investment-backed expectations of the 
plaintiffs.145 Accordingly, there was no temporary taking under Penn 
Central.146 
In Cane Tennessee v. United States,147 the plaintiffs, Cane and Colton, 
owned coal property.148 Mining permit renewals for the Cane property 
were denied for several years.149 Following the permit denials, a citizen’s 
prohibited act was one already impermissible under state nuisance law, which the defendant had not 
alleged in Bass, this factor weighed against the government. Id. at 619–20. 
 137. Id. at 619–20. 
 138. Id. at 615, 619–20. Note that the 1996 court did not consider the temporary nature of the 
claim, but rather found that the denial was permanent. Id. at 617 n.2, 618, 620. The Federal Circuit 
reversed this permanent takings finding. Bass Enters., 133 F.3d at 894. 
 139. Bass Enters., 54 Fed. Cl. at 401. As in 1996, the court found that the plaintiff’s investment-
backed expectations were reasonable. Id. at 403. In direct opposition of their earlier rationale, the court 
adopted a balancing approach rather than a nuisance analysis when evaluating the character of the 
government action. Id. Under the balancing approach, the public health and welfare concerns 
surrounding the stability of the nuclear waste storage facility trumped the plaintiff’s property interest. 
Id. 
 140. Id. at 403–04. 
 141. Id. at 404. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. The Bass plaintiff’s oil drilling activities threatened the stability of the new nuclear waste 
storage facility and thus the welfare of the public. Id. The Federal Circuit analyzed the character factor 
on appeal in 2004 as well. Bass Enters. Prod. Co. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1360, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 
2004); see infra notes 156–63 and accompanying text. 
 145. Bass Enters., 381 F.3d at 1370. 
 146. Id. 
 147. 57 Fed. Cl. 115 (Fed. Cl. 2003). 
 148. Id. at 119. Cane and Colton leased this property to Eastern Minerals and Van Buren 
respectively. Id.  
 149. Id. Pursuant to the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA), Eastern 
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group brought a petition in 1995 requesting that both the Cane and Colton 
properties be designated unsuitable for mining.150 Although the process 
was originally scheduled to end in 1996, the government failed to reach a 
conclusion until 2000.151 The property was later designated in 2000 by the 
federal government as unsuitable for coal mining.152 
By using the “parcel as a whole” approach neither property suffered a 
loss in value sufficient to warrant finding a permanent taking when 
weighed against the compelling government interest served by the 
restrictions.153  
In its analysis of the temporary takings claim, the court rejected the 
Cane plaintiff’s “rolling moratoria” basis for recovery because the 
Minerals obtained permits to mine coal in 1980 and 1981. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201–1328 (1986); Cane 
Tenn., 57 Fed. Cl. at 119. Beginning in 1984 Eastern Minerals’ permit renewal for the Cane property 
was denied. Cane Tenn., 57 Fed. Cl. at 120. In 1991, Cane terminated the lease. Id. However, Eastern 
Minerals persisted in requesting a permit until a final decision was rendered in 1994 denying the right 
to mine coal. Id. 
 150. Cane Tenn., 57 Fed. Cl. at 120. 
 151. Id. According to Cane, plaintiffs bringing delay-type regulatory takings must first establish 
an “extraordinary” delay in order to prevail under Penn Central on a temporary takings claim. Id. at 
132 (“[A] finding of extraordinary delay is a condition precedent to undertaking a Penn Central 
analysis of whether a taking had occurred.”); see also Spinell Homes, Inc. v. Municipality of 
Anchorage, 78 P.3d 692, 701 (Alaska 2003) (finding a ten to twenty-nine day delay in the permitting 
process insufficient for a successful takings claim); Loewenstein v. City of Lafayette, 127 Cal. Rptr.2d 
79, 88, 90–91 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (ruling that a delay of over two years was not unreasonable without 
undertaking a full Penn Central analysis); Woodland Manor, III Assocs. v. Reisma, No. C.A. PC89-
2447, 2003 WL 1224248, at *15 (R.I. Super. Ct. Feb. 24, 2003) (considering an eight-year delay akin 
to physical invasion and therefore compensable). In contrast, in Cooley v. United States, the Federal 
Circuit described the extraordinary delay inquiry in its overview of the third Penn Central factor, the 
character of the government action, rather than as a condition precedent to a Penn Central inquiry. 
Cooley v. United States, 324 F.3d 1297, 1306–07 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 In Cane, even though the petition process took over four years (between 1995 and 2000) there was 
no unreasonable delay. Cane Tenn., 57 Fed. Cl. at 133. The defendant disputed this characterization of 
the length of the delay. Id. Cane and Colton argued that the delay in the use of their property was over 
three years: the time between the statutory deadline for the permit petition process and the actual 
evaluation made by the government. Id. The defendant argued that the delay consisted of little over a 
year. Id. at 134. The court determined that it totaled almost two years, but that this was not 
unreasonable in light of the government’s good faith. Id. at 133–34 (citing Wyatt v. United States, 271 
F.3d 1090, 1095 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). Specifically, the court found that the delay began on the projected 
date of the unsuitability petition result in 1996 and lasted until 1997 when it was statutorily required to 
be published. Id. at 134. At that time, the citizen’s group requested an extension. Id. The court 
reasoned that “where any delay beyond 15 months resulted from the government’s decision to allow 
additional citizen input concerning a petition of substantial public interest” there was no bad faith. Id. 
This led the court to the conclusion that there was no extraordinary delay and therefore, no temporary 
taking. Id. 
 152. Cane Tenn., 57 Fed. Cl. at 133. 
 153. Under the “parcel as a whole” framework the Cane property suffered a 49.6% decline in 
value and the Colton property suffered at most a 28% decline in value. Id. at 125, 131. Under the Penn 
Central framework, both values were insufficient to establish a permanent taking of either property 
when coupled with the court’s analysis of the two other Penn Central factors. Id. at 125, 131. 
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restrictions in Cane were not entirely sequential.154 For example, the Cane 
plaintiff had taken no action to acquire a permit between the termination of 
the lease in February 1991 and the beginning of the petition for 
unsuitability process in October 1995.155 
2. The Character of the Government Action 
The next four cases discussed illustrate the multifarious interpretations 
of the role of the third Penn Central factor, the character of the 
government action in post-Tahoe-Sierra takings law. In 2004, the Federal 
Circuit affirmed the Federal Claims Court’s 2002 post-Tahoe-Sierra 
decision in Bass.156 In doing so, the Federal Circuit affirmed the denial of 
the plaintiff’s Lucas claim because of the temporary nature of the alleged 
takings.157 
With regard to the Penn Central claim in Bass, the plaintiff argued158 
that the character of the government action factor required that a taking be 
found so long as the plaintiff’s activities were not a nuisance.159 The 
Federal Circuit noted that the plaintiff erred by over-simplifying the 
character of the government action prong of the Penn Central test.160 
Tahoe-Sierra established the complexity of the determination of the 
character of the government action factor.161 This factor requires more 
than analysis of nuisances, but rather an assessment of the “purpose and 
 154. Id. at 133. The Cane court is the first court to apply the “rolling moratoria” theory as 
espoused in Tahoe-Sierra. 
 155. Id. at 132–33. The same theory provided no relief for the Colton plaintiff because there had 
been no action to obtain a permit to mine on the Colton property for over twenty-six years, since the 
1977 enactment of the federal statute. Id. at 133. 
 156. Bass Enters. Prod. Co. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004). For a 
discussion of the prior Bass litigation see supra notes 125–46 and accompanying text. 
 157. Bass Enters., 381 F.3d at 1365–66. 
 158. The plaintiffs actually made two arguments on appeal with regard to the Penn Central claim. 
First, the plaintiffs argued that the lower court had erred in finding that there was no extraordinary 
delay. Id. at 1365–66. The second argument concerned the character of the government action. Id. at 
1369. In rejecting the plaintiff’s first argument, the Federal Circuit noted that the reasons for the 
government’s delay in granting the permits were justified. Id. at 1367. Therefore, there was no 
extraordinary delay. Id. at 1366–68; see discussion of second argument infra notes 160–63 and 
accompanying text. 
 159. Bass Enters., 381 F.3d at 1369. 
 160. Id. at 1370. 
 161. Id. For a criticism of this type of interpretation of the character factor, see Schwartz, infra 
note 288, at 20–21 (critiquing courts for transforming the character factor from a distinction between 
physical and non-physical government action into “a completely different inquiry” that requires 
“balancing the importance of the public purpose of the regulation against the private purpose to be 
served by the owner's proposed use.”). 
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economic effect” of government action.162 The Court of Federal Claims 
had correctly determined that the underlying public purpose and benefit of 
the government’s actions weighed against finding a taking.163 
In Appolo Fuels, Inc. v. United States,164 the plaintiff received notice 
that its application for mining was “administratively complete” in March 
1994.165 Almost two years later, in January 1996, most of the land was 
declared unsuitable for mining.166 The plaintiff claimed the permit denial 
and ultimate bar on mining constituted (1) a Lucas categorical taking,167 
and (2) a Penn Central partial regulatory taking.168 
The Appolo court found the relevant parcel included portions of the 
plaintiff’s leased parcels not in the area declared unsuitable for mining.169 
When the entirety of each leased parcel was considered, one parcel lost 
92% of its value and the other 78% of its value.170 Because the land did 
not lose all of its value, the Federal Circuit affirmed that no Lucas 
categorical taking occurred.171 
The Appolo plaintiff also did not suffer from a partial regulatory taking 
under Penn Central.172 The economic impact factor weighed in favor of 
finding a taking because of the 92% and 78% decline in the leaseholds’ 
value.173 However, the 1977 enactment of the Surface Mining and Coal 
Reclamation Act provided the plaintiff with ample warning that its land 
might be declared unsuitable for mining.174 Thus, the investment-backed 
 162. Bass Enters., 381 F.3d at 1370 (quoting Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l 
Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 323 (2002)).  
 163. Id. at 1370. This analysis required the Court of Federal Claims to consider “the relative 
benefits and burdens associated with the regulatory action.” Id. 
 164. 381 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 165. Id. at 1343. 
 166. Id. The City of Middlesboro and the National Parks and Conservation Association filed a 
LUM (Lands Unsuitable for Mining) petition shortly after the plaintiff filed its SMCRA permit 
application. Id. Although the law mandates that LUM decisions be reached within one year, the Office 
of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSM) took eighteen months to come to its decision. 
Id. at 1351. 
 167. Id. at 1347. 
 168. Id. at 1347–51. The plaintiff also claimed that the six month delay in issuing the LUM 
decision constituted a temporary taking under the extraordinary delay theory. Id. at 1351. 
 169. Id. at 1346. The plaintiff held several leases in the area. Id. at 1343. The plaintiff’s suit 
concerned two of these leases: lease 5A and 14A. Id. at 1346. The court’s consideration of the entirety 
of each lease as the relevant parcel provides a good recent example of the rejection of horizontal 
(spatial) segmentation.  
 170. Id. at 1347.  
 171. Id.  
 172. Id. at 1351. 
 173. Id. at 1348, 1351. 
 174. Id. at 1348. 
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expectations factor weighed against finding a taking.175 Finally, the court 
considered the character of the government’s action.176 The government’s 
action served to protect the water quality of Fern Lake, which provided 
water for a nearby town.177 Therefore, the government acted pursuant to its 
police power in order to protect the public health and safety.178 The court 
concluded that no taking occurred because together the lack of reasonable 
investment-backed expectations and the character of the government 
action outweighed the economic impact factor.179 
Although Santini v. Connecticut Hazardous Waste Management 
Service180 involved pre-condemnation activities rather than regulations, it 
provides a recent example of the historical interpretation of the character 
factor applied in regulatory takings cases. In Santini, the plaintiff spent $5 
million purchasing and developing some Connecticut property for single-
family residences before the state declared the property one of three 
possible sites for a nuclear waste disposal facility.181 Due to the 
announcement and the associated stigma, Santini was unable to sell homes 
for over two years.182 Despite Santini’s loss, the Second Circuit found no 
taking occurred.183 The court noted that pre-condemnation activities never 
form the basis of viable takings claims.184 
Although it summarily dismissed Santini’s takings claim on this 
ground, the court noted that Santini lacked a viable Lucas claim because of 
the temporary nature of the alleged takings.185 The Second Circuit also 
 175. Id. at 1348–50. 
 176. Id. at 1350–51. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 1351. 
 180. 342 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 181. Id. at 121–22. 
 182. Id. at 123. About one year after plaintiff’s property was announced as a finalist for the 
proposed facility, the designation was revoked. Id. at 122. Santini claimed that the stigma surrounding 
the announcement prevented sales for thirteen months after the revocation of the site designation. Id. at 
123. 
 183. Id. at 130–33. 
 184. Id. at 130 (“The fact that Santini’s takings claim is based on nothing more than the Service's 
1991 siting announcement—perhaps the prototypical precondemnation governmental activity—dooms 
the claim on its merits, as the Supreme Court has explicitly held that precondemnation activities do not 
constitute takings.”). In his petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court, Santini argues that the Second 
Circuit’s quick dismissal of his takings claim based on this categorization of the government’s 
activities amounts to a per se rule. Santini v. Conn. Hazardous Waste Mgmt. Servs., 342 F.3d 118 (2d 
Cir. 2003), petition for cert. filed, 2004 WL 1697994, at *19, **26–27 (U.S. July 27, 2004) (No. 04–
142). Santini argues that this “violates the Penn Central three-factor balancing analysis by regarding 
the ‘character of the action’ as dispositive and by disregarding economic impact and interference with 
investment backed expectations.” Id. at **26–27. 
 185. Santini, 342 F.3d at 131. Due to the temporary nature of the effect of the site designation, 
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postulated that Santini’s Penn Central claim would fail despite the 
arguably large economic impact on Santini and the proposal’s interference 
with his reasonable investment-backed expectations.186 The court focused 
instead on the character of the government action.187 Because the site 
designation did not amount to physical appropriation of Santini’s 
property,188 the court reasoned that the character of the government action 
weighed in favor of the state.189 
In Friedenberg v. New York State Department of Conservation,190 the 
Department of Conservation denied the plaintiff a permit to construct a 
single-family residence on property191 designated as tidal wetlands.192 
Although Friedenberg’s property suffered a 95% decrease in value,193 this 
Santini did not lose all economically viable use of his property. Id. (citing Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 
Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 332 (2002)). 
 186. Id. at 132. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Steven J. Eagle notes that Loretto eliminated much of the bite of the character of the 
government action factor of the Penn Central test. See Eagle, supra note 24, at 3. Four years after 
Penn Central, Loretto made physical invasions per se takings. Id. at 2. Under Agins v. City of Tiburon, 
any regulations that do not promote “legitimate state interests” are takings as well. Id. at 3. Thus, 
physical invasions and regulations that do not promote legitimate state interests are weeded out as 
takings before courts even consider the Penn Central test. Id. Eagle argues that this leaves little ground 
for the character of the government action. Id. He proposes giving the character prong new meaning. 
Id. at 4. Specifically, government regulations that operate on a severely retroactive basis or 
government actions that target specific individuals should fail the character prong. Id. at 4–5. Contra 
Schwartz, infra note 288, at 20–21 (condemning reinterpretation of the character factor). 
 189. Santini, 342 F.3d at 132. The court noted: 
Though the siting announcement no doubt had an economic impact on Santini's property, and 
interfered with his investment-backed expectations to some extent, the character of the 
governmental action is of principal importance here. The Service's siting announcement 
obviously cannot be characterized as a “physical invasion” of Santini’s property, but, rather, 
merely one step along a path that might have led—but ultimately did not lead—to the 
government's acquisition of his property. 
Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 Similarly, in Grenier v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Chatham, the Massachusetts Appeals Court’s 
analysis of the character factor consisted of a simple statement that the government’s zoning 
regulations did not amount to a physical appropriation of the plaintiff’s property. Grenier v. Zoning 
Bd. of Appeals of Chatham, 814 N.E.2d 1154, 1161 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004) (“As for the third and final 
factor . . . we need say no more than that [the plaintiff’s] allegations concern only economic 
considerations rather than any physical invasion of lot 93 by the government.”). 
 190. 767 N.Y.S.2d 451 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003). 
 191. The 2.5 acre property was zoned residential. Id. at 453.  
 192. Id. Like mining regulations, restrictions on wetlands constitute another recurring impetus for 
takings claims. Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433, 1439 n.37 (1993) (outlining the long history 
of takings litigation involving wetlands regulations). 
 193. The plaintiff’s property value dropped from $665,000 to $31,500. Friedenberg, 767 
N.Y.S.2d at 455–56. 
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decline in value did not amount to a loss of all economically beneficial 
use.194 Therefore, there was no Lucas categorical taking.195  
Despite the failure of Friedenberg’s Lucas claim, Friedenberg prevailed 
under Penn Central.196 The significant reduction of economic value197 
outweighed the important public interest served by the restrictions.198 The 
court reasoned that the outcome of the character factor did not depend on 
the legitimacy of the government’s action.199 Instead, the character of the 
government action was determined by the distribution of the benefits and 
burdens of regulatory action.200 Although the protection of the tidal waters 
was important, the court found that the plaintiff alone should not have to 
bear that burden.201 Specifically, the plaintiff did not benefit from any 
“reciprocity of advantage or shared benefit” by giving up the right to 
develop the property.202 The lack of “reciprocity of advantage” coupled 
with the severe economic impact led the court to find a partial regulatory 
taking under Penn Central.203 
C. Avoiding the “Parcel as a Whole” 
Several state courts have continued the pre-Tahoe-Sierra trend of 
divergence between state and federal takings jurisprudence. These courts 
have ruled in favor of takings plaintiffs without utilizing the “parcel as a 
whole” framework established in Tahoe-Sierra.204 For example, in State ex 
 194. Id. at 458. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 460 (finding the permit denial eliminated “all but a bare residue of the economic value 
of the property”).  
 198. Id. at 453, 460 (reciting government’s legitimate interest in protecting tidal wetlands); see 
also Norman v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 231, 282–83 (Fed. Cl. 2004) (listing four functions of 
wetlands regulations). 
 199. Id.; see supra notes 49–54 and accompanying text. 
 200. Friedenberg, 767 N.Y.S.2d at 460–61; see supra notes 49–54 and accompanying text. 
 201. Friedenberg, 767 N.Y.S.2d. at 461. 
 202. Id. In contrast, in Norman v. United States, the Court of Federal Claims found that the 
character factor weighed in favor of the government. Norman, 63 Fed. C1. at 286–87. 
 In Norman, the plaintiff could still build on his 220.85 acres of wetlands so long as he mitigated 
by setting aside an equivalent amount of property. Id. The character factor weighed against finding a 
taking because mitigation regulation benefited the plaintiff as well as the public by allowing 
development while preserving wetlands. Id. 
 203. Friedenberg, 767 N.Y.S.2d at 460–61. 
 204. See James E. Holloway & Donald C. Guy, The Impact of a Federal Takings Norm on 
Fashioning a Means-Ends Fit Under Takings Provisions of State Constitutions, 8 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. 
& POL’Y 143, 239 (1999) (noting that state takings law did not exactly adhere to federal takings 
jurisprudence even before Tahoe-Sierra). 
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rel. R.T.G., Inc. v. State,205 the plaintiff’s 833-acre mining property was 
designated unsuitable for mining because mining operations threatened a 
town’s water supply.206 The Ohio Supreme Court noted that states retain 
the power to define property within their bounds.207 Accordingly, the court 
recognized mineral rights as a separate property right from surface 
rights.208 The mineral rights alone were the denominator.209 Using this 
approach to the denominator problem, the plaintiffs suffered a complete 
loss in the value of their coal property and were afforded compensation for 
their loss under Lucas.210 
Similarly, the Oregon Court of Appeals found for takings plaintiffs in 
Coast Range Conifers, L.L.C. v. State.211 The court found that when a state 
agency denied the plaintiffs of the right to log within 400 feet of an 
unoccupied bald eagle nest,212 the state was not entitled to summary 
judgment on a takings claim under the Oregon Constitution.213 In coming 
to this conclusion, the court explicitly rejected the applicability of the 
“parcel as a whole” rule under the Oregon Constitution214 despite its 
similar wording to the United States Constitution.215 
 205. 780 N.E.2d 998 (Ohio 2002). 
 206. Id. at 1001. 
 207. Id. at 1008. 
 208. Id. at 1008–09. The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 
19 provides that coal rights are a severable property interest when the owner originally purchased the 
property solely for purposes of mining coal. Id. The Ohio Supreme Court’s application of Ohio law 
seems at odds with the United States Supreme Court and Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s application of 
similar Pennsylvania law in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1986), 
and Machipongo Land and Coal Co. v. Commonwealth, 799 A.2d 751 (Pa. 2002). In Keystone, the 
Supreme Court expressly declined severing interests in land and coal despite Pennsylvania’s 
recognition of three separate estates in land, including a mineral estate. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 478, 
496–501; see also Machipongo, 799 A.2d at 760, 765–68 (using a similar application of takings 
analysis under Pennsylvania law). 
 209. See R.T.G., 780 N.E.2d at 1008–09. 
 210. Id. at 1009–10. R.T.G. provides a nice contrast to Appolo; in both cases the government 
sought to protect municipal water supplies by denying mining permits. Id. at 1001; Appolo Fuels, Inc. 
v. United States, 381 F.3d 1338, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The courts reached different outcomes on the 
Lucas claims through their treatment of the economic impact factor. See R.T.G., 780 N.E.2d at 1009–
10; Appolo, 381 F.3d at 1347. 
 211. 76 P.3d 1148, 1158 (Or. Ct. App. 2003). 
 212. Id. at 1149.  
 213. Id. at 1158. 
 214. Id.  
 215. Id. at 1156. The Oregon Takings Clause states that “Private property shall not be taken for 
public use, nor the particular services of any man be demanded, without just compensation. . . .” OR. 
CONST. art. I, § 18; compare U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public 
use, without just compensation.”). 
 Johnson v. City of Minneapolis, 667 N.W.2d 109 (Minn. 2003), involved pre-condemnation 
activities rather than regulatory restrictions. Id. at 111. However, it also illustrates courts’ reluctance to 
strictly apply the “parcel as a whole” rule. See id. at 115. In Johnson, the plaintiffs were lessors who 
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In Woodland Manor, III Associates v. Reisma,216 the plaintiff’s 
property had received development approval in 1974.217 However, in 
1985, the government required the plaintiff to file a new application.218 It 
then denied the application for twenty acres of the eighty-nine acre 
property because of wetlands located thereon.219 After detailing the 
contradictory history of federal takings analysis,220 the Superior Court of 
Rhode Island determined that under Penn Central there was a temporary 
taking of the twenty acres.221 Rather than relying on the strict language of 
found their properties unmarketable after the defendant City announced condemnation plans for the 
area. Id. at 112. The City initially failed to notify the plaintiffs of the possibility that the properties 
might not be condemned. Id. Even after it became apparent that the proposed mall would not be built, 
the City took no action to remove the cloud over plaintiffs’ titles. Id. at 113. Accordingly, the court 
weighed the fact that “the City specifically targeted appellants’ properties and acted in bad faith” in its 
takings analysis. Id. at 116. The plaintiffs lost rental income from tenants who moved in anticipation of 
the condemnation. Id. at 113. 
 Rather than working through the federal takings analysis, the Minnesota Supreme Court relied on 
Minnesota statutory law and the Minnesota Constitution’s Takings Clause, which is worded similarly 
to the federal Takings Clause, to find a compensable taking. Id. at 115–16. The Minnesota Constitution 
provides, “[p]rivate property shall not be taken, destroyed or damaged for public use without just 
compensation.” MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13; compare U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private 
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”). Despite the similarity in the wording of 
both takings clauses, the Minnesota Supreme Court interpreted them differently. Johnson, 667 N.W.2d 
at 114–16; see also Holloway & Guy, supra note 204, at 152–56 (containing an analysis of the basic 
differences between state takings clauses and the federal Takings Clause and the potential for greater 
protection under state constitutions). Minnesota statutory law defines a taking as including “every 
interference, under the right of eminent domain, with the possession, enjoyment, or value of private 
property.” MINN. STAT. § 117.025, subd. 2 (2002). Accordingly, the Minnesota Supreme Court found 
that the City’s activities constituted a compensable taking under Minnesota, rather than federal, law. 
Johnson, 667 N.W.2d at 116. 
 Unlike the Minnesota and Oregon courts, the Texas Supreme Court in Sheffield Development 
Company, Inc. v. City of Glenn Heights, 140 S.W.3d 660, 669 (Tex. 2004), relied on federal takings 
jurisprudence when interpreting a takings claim under the Texas Constitution. The Texas takings 
clause reads “[n]o person’s property shall be taken, damaged or destroyed for or applied to public use 
without adequate compensation being made. . . .” TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17. Prior to Sheffield, at least 
one Texas court had interpreted the two takings clauses as having different meanings based on the 
additional language in the Texas Constitution. Trinity & S. Ry. Co. v. Meadows, 11 S.W. 145, 146 
(Tex. 1889). 
 216. No. C.A. PC89-2447, 2003 WL 1224248 (R.I. Super. Ct. Feb. 24, 2003). 
 217. Id. at **1–2. Specifically, the Woodland Manor plaintiff received a favorable determination 
from the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development in response to his Request for 
Freshwater Wetlands Applicability Determination. Id.  
 218. Id. at *2. 
 219. Id. at **2–3, **7–8. 
 220. Id. at *7 (describing the “[t]angled [w]eb of [t]akings [a]nalysis”). 
 221. Id. at *8, **14–15. In determining that the relevant parcel was twenty rather than all eighty-
nine acres, the court considered: (1) that the plaintiff need not show that every portion of his property 
was taken under Penn Central; (2) that the twenty acre parcel had been deeded separately in the past; 
and (3) that the Rhode Island Supreme Court had issued an order regarding only the twenty acre 
parcel. Id. at *8. 
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Tahoe-Sierra, the court concluded that its decision for the plaintiff 
embodied the “spirit of the Takings Clause.”222 
IV. THE EFFECTS OF TAHOE-SIERRA ON REGULATORY TAKINGS 
There are several trends emerging as a result of Tahoe-Sierra. First, 
Tahoe-Sierra severely limits the application of the Lucas categorical 
rule.223 Second, the rejection of temporal segmentation and the reciprocal 
reaffirmation of Penn Central’s “parcel as a whole” approach degenerates 
takings plaintiffs’ ability to show an economic loss sufficient to prevail 
under Penn Central.224 Third, in response to potential injustices resulting 
under the “parcel as a whole” framework, some state courts may attempt 
to avoid the “parcel as a whole” analysis entirely.225 Other courts may 
attempt to place new checks on government action by remolding the 
character factor of the Penn Central test or adopting one of the alternate 
rationales outlined in Tahoe-Sierra’s dicta.226 
A. The Limited Role of Lucas in Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence After 
Tahoe-Sierra 
The per se rule that emerged from First English227 and Lucas228 
provided property owners a potential means for recovery for temporary 
takings without requiring a full Penn Central analysis.229 This means of 
recovery proved only temporary.230 Although property owners continue to 
bring Lucas claims in the temporary takings context after Tahoe-Sierra, 
these claims are uniformly rejected by courts.231 
Lucas owes its demise to Tahoe-Sierra’s affirmation of the “parcel as a 
whole” approach and rejection of temporal segmentation.232 Without 
 222. Id. at *15. 
 223. See infra notes 227–40 and accompanying text. 
 224. See infra notes 241–49 and accompanying text. 
 225. See infra notes 250–58 and accompanying text. 
 226. See infra notes 259–99 and accompanying text. 
 227. See supra notes 55–61 and accompanying text. 
 228. See supra notes 62–71 and accompanying text. 
 229. See supra notes 62–71 and accompanying text. 
 230. Tahoe-Sierra’s rejection of temporal segmentation makes it impossible for a temporary 
takings plaintiff to show the loss of all value as required for a recovery under Lucas. See supra notes 
91–96 and accompanying text. 
 231. See supra notes 117–19 and accompanying text. Even in the permanent taking context, a 
98.8% loss in value is insufficient. See also supra notes 119, 193–94 and accompanying text. 
 232. Under Tahoe-Sierra, a loss of all value requires a permanent loss. See supra notes 91–103 
and accompanying text.  
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temporal segmentation, a temporary takings plaintiff can never “solve” the 
denominator problem in a way that will produce a value of 1.233 The value 
of the loss over a temporary period will never be equal to the value of the 
property over the infinite duration of a fee simple estate.234 Bass illustrates 
that for the purposes of the denominator question, even leasehold interests 
cannot be severed from the fee simple for purposes of evaluating the 
denominator after Tahoe-Sierra.235 Thus, it is virtually impossible to suffer 
the 100% decline in value necessary for a temporary Lucas claim. 
A plaintiff will never succeed in showing that a temporary restriction 
comprised a Lucas-type loss of all economically productive or beneficial 
use after Tahoe-Sierra.236 Even in the permanent takings context, plaintiffs 
have failed to show this type of complete loss as illustrated by 
Friedenberg and Cooley where even 95% and 98.8% respective 
diminutions in value were insufficient for a Lucas claim.237 In the 
temporary takings context, both the Bass and Cane courts rejected 
temporal segmentation as mandated by the Tahoe-Sierra majority.238 The 
Supreme Court’s evaluation of the denominator problem has effectively 
eliminated per se temporary takings.239 Furthermore, Tahoe-Sierra makes 
it exceedingly difficult to prevail with a permanent takings claim under 
Lucas.240 
B. Increased Difficulty for Plaintiffs Under Penn Central  
The “parcel as a whole” approach also makes it more difficult to 
demonstrate an adverse economic impact severe enough to prevail under a 
Penn Central rationale.241 Bass illustrates well the new obstacle created by 
 233. See supra notes 91–96, 101–07 and accompanying text. 
 234. See supra notes 91–96, 101–07 and accompanying text. 
 235. While the facts in Bass supported a finding of a Lucas claim before Tahoe-Sierra, the facts 
were not sufficient to support a Lucas claim after Tahoe-Sierra. Compare supra note 132 and 
accompanying text with notes 133–34 and accompanying text. Furthermore, in the Penn Central 
analysis, the court did not consider the leasehold nature of the interest in its resolution of the 
denominator problem. See supra notes 139–46 and accompanying text. 
 236. See supra notes 91–96 and accompanying text. 
 237. See supra notes 119, 189–203 and accompanying text. 
 238. See supra notes 132–34, 141–43, 148–53 and accompanying text. 
 239. In Friedenberg, even a 95% loss in value was insufficient to support a Lucas permanent 
takings claim. See supra notes 189–203 and accompanying text. Similarly, in Cooley, a 98.8% 
diminution did not suffice. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. It seems Justice Stevens 
fulfilled the prophecy he first set out in his dissent in Lucas; the Lucas holding was effectively eclipsed 
by the dispositive denominator question. See discussion supra note 70. 
 240. See supra notes 115, 135–46 and accompanying text. 
 241. See supra notes 135–46, 172–79, 181–89 and accompanying text. 
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Tahoe-Sierra in the temporary takings context.242 While the pre-Tahoe-
Sierra court found a taking under Penn Central,243 after Tahoe-Sierra even 
a loss of over $1 million caused by the inability to mine for four years did 
not warrant compensation because the total value of the plaintiff’s interest 
was over $20 million.244 Weighed against the important government 
interest involved, the plaintiff’s mere 5% loss in Bass could not support a 
successful takings claim.245 By using the “parcel as a whole” rationale to 
nullify Lucas per se temporary takings, the Supreme Court also made it 
more difficult for temporary takings plaintiffs to prevail under Penn 
Central. 
Although the Supreme Court’s holding was arguably narrow in Tahoe-
Sierra,246 the Court’s reaffirmation of the “parcel as a whole” approach in 
order to eliminate temporal segmentation has also affected horizontal 
(spatial) and vertical (use-based) segmentation.247 For example, the 
relevant parcel in Appolo consisted of the entirety of the plaintiff’s 
leaseholds rather than merely the areas designated unsuitable for 
mining.248 Even the 92% decline in value of one of the Appolo plaintiff’s 
leaseholds was insufficient for a regulatory taking under Penn Central.249 
C. “Fairness and Justice” After Tahoe-Sierra 
In one respect Tahoe-Sierra represents a return to the theory underlying 
Mugler: the balance between the interests of land use planners and 
landowners has tipped in favor of the land use planners.250 This tipping 
comes at the expense of landowners and may result in unfairness in some 
situations.251  
 242. Bass Enters. Prod. Co. v. United States, 54 Fed. Cl. 400, 404 (Fed. Cl. 2002); see supra notes 
125–46 and accompanying text. 
 243. See supra notes 135–38 and accompanying text. 
 244. Bass Enters., 54 Fed. Cl. at 404; see supra notes 139–46 and accompanying text; see also 
Mandelker, supra note 48, at 16–17.  
 245. See supra notes 125–46 and accompanying text. 
 246. See supra notes 15, 19 and accompanying text. 
 247. Tahoe-Sierra’s reaffirmation of the “parcel as a whole” approach provides support for the 
rejection of vertical (use-based) and horizontal (spatial) segmentation as well. See supra notes 115, 
165–179 and accompanying text. 
 248. See supra notes 115, 165–79 and accompanying text; see also cases cited supra note 115. 
 249. See discussion supra notes 165–79; see cases cited supra note 115. 
 250. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668–69 (1887) (deferring to the regulatory power of the 
states); see also supra notes 25–31 and accompanying text. Tahoe-Sierra echoes this need for land use 
regulations by cautioning that per se rules could cripple governments by making them unaffordable 
luxuries. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 335; see Savage, supra note 17, at 32; see also supra notes 101–03 
and accompanying text. 
 251. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Tahoe-Sierra describes such an instance of unfairness to 
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Tahoe-Sierra’s focus on the denominator problem shifts the underlying 
emphasis of takings jurisprudence from the qualitative judicial 
determinations of the relative interests of the parties, to the quantitative 
assessments of the value of the plaintiff’s property.252 In Pennsylvania 
Coal, Holmes advocated making a qualitative determination when a 
regulation goes “too far,” allowing courts to evaluate the underlying 
fairness.253 Tahoe-Sierra discourages this flexibility in evaluating 
qualitative notions of fairness by reaffirming the more quantitative “parcel 
as a whole” approach.254 The “parcel as a whole” framework stands in 
opposition to horizontal (spatial), vertical (use-based), and temporal 
severance of property interests. Many courts adhering to the “parcel as a 
whole” framework have been reluctant to allow severance in even the 
horizontal (spatial) and vertical (use-based) contexts.255 And without 
severance, the outcome of the denominator problem and accordingly, the 
economic impact factor of the Penn Central balancing test, is almost a 
foregone conclusion.256 Under the Penn Central analysis courts typically 
property owners. See discussion supra note 97. 
 252. See supra notes 32–54, 91–96 and accompanying text. 
 253. See supra notes 25–31 and accompanying text. 
 254. See supra notes 112–21 and accompanying text. The denominator problem provides a 
deceptively easy solution to a difficult question, but at the cost of the overall fairness of takings 
jurisprudence. Dayana C. Wright recently outlined three pitfalls of the “parcel as a whole” approach: 
(1) it makes landowners more vulnerable to takings when they have sold noncontiguous property prior 
to the regulation; (2) economic value is a poor tool for measuring the relevant property interest; and (3) 
it ignores the “dynamic use of property over time and the snapshot evaluation that occurs in the takings 
calculation when determining the regulatory moment.” Dayana C. Wright, A New Time for 
Denominators: Toward a Dynamic Theory of Property in the Regulatory Takings Relevant Parcel 
Analysis, 34 ENVTL. L. 175, 219–20 (2004).  
 In addition to the problems outlined by Wright, by denouncing severance in favor of the “parcel as 
a whole” approach, courts are left evaluating the value of the plaintiff’s property. The more property 
the plaintiff owns, the greater the denominator. Thus, the result of a takings analysis under the “parcel 
as a whole” approach depends not on the relative strength of the property owner and government’s 
interests or overall fairness, but on the extent of the plaintiff’s property interests. For example, imagine 
that the plaintiff in Woodland Manor possessed only twenty acres rather than eighty-nine; the 
restriction on the twenty acres would have denied the plaintiff of all beneficial use. See supra notes 
216–22 and accompanying text. Had this hypothetical plaintiff been unable to afford a larger parcel of 
property, the plaintiff might have prevailed on a Lucas claim (presuming the regulation was 
permanent) even under strict adherence to the “parcel as a whole” approach. See id.; see also 
Mandelker, supra note 48, at 16–17 (using the facts in Penn Central as a demonstration of this 
problem with the “parcel as a whole” rationale). 
 255. See supra note 115 (detailing post-Tahoe-Sierra cases in which horizontal and vertical 
severance were rejected). 
 256. See supra note 115. In contrast, in R.T.G. the Ohio Court of Appeals rejected the “parcel as a 
whole” approach and found that a mining restriction comprised a taking precisely because coal estates 
were severable under Ohio law. See supra notes 204–10 and accompanying text. In contrast, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Machipongo was restrained from finding a taking of a coal estate 
because it obeyed Tahoe-Sierra’s reaffirmation of the “parcel as a whole” approach. See discussion 
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weigh the character of the government action heavily against finding a 
taking.257 When the importance of the government action is coupled with 
courts’ reluctance to freely mold the economic impact factor through 
severance, it is not surprising that many temporary and permanent takings 
claims have failed since Tahoe-Sierra.258  
D. Working With and Around the “Parcel as a Whole” Framework After 
Tahoe-Sierra 
The perception of unfairness resulting from strict application of the 
“parcel as a whole” rule may also account for the fact that several state 
courts have relied on state constitutional law or vague notions of the 
“spirit of the Takings Clause” in post-Tahoe-Sierra takings cases rather 
than Tahoe-Sierra’s “parcel as a whole” rule.259 In the future, other courts 
may take a less drastic approach to avoiding the occasionally harsh 
outcome of the “parcel as a whole” rule; by reinterpreting the character 
factor of the Penn Central test, at least one court has offset the “parcel as a 
whole” rule’s impact on the economic impact factor.260 Finally, the 
Supreme Court itself may have recognized the implicit dangers of 
overemphasis on the “parcel as a whole” resolution of the denominator 
problem when it provided dicta suggesting alternate rationales, such as the 
“rolling moratoria” theory, that might apply under other factual 
scenarios.261 Future courts may turn to some of these alternate rationales. 
1. State Courts: Alternatives to the “Parcel as a Whole” 
Before the Supreme Court’s decision in Tahoe-Sierra, state takings 
jurisprudence diverged from federal takings jurisprudence; Tahoe-Sierra 
did not stop this trend. Perhaps as a result of unfairness, several state 
courts have attempted to avoid the “parcel as a whole” rule entirely.262 
This has the effect of allowing plaintiffs to avoid a Penn Central inquiry, 
supra note 115. 
 257. See supra notes 112–14 and accompanying text. For background on the application of the 
Penn Central test, see supra notes 32–54 and accompanying text. 
 258. See cases cited supra notes 112–20. 
 259. See supra notes 204–22 and accompanying text. 
 260. See supra notes 189–203 and accompanying text.  
 261. See supra notes 108–11, 148–55 and accompanying text. 
 262. See supra notes 189–203 and accompanying text; see also Rebecca Nowak-Doubek, 
Comment, A Victory for Property Rights: How State Courts Have Interpreted and Applied the 
Decision from Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 36 U. 
TOL. L. REV. 405, 422 (2005) (arguing state courts have been reluctant to follow the parcel as whole 
rule from Tahoe-Sierra). 
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not unlike the Lucas categorical test.263 For example, Ohio, Oregon, and 
Rhode Island courts have all taken this route in the regulatory takings 
context.264  
State constitutional law provides one means for state courts to 
circumvent Tahoe-Sierra.265 In Coast Range and R.T.G, Oregon and Ohio 
courts respectively took this approach by interpreting the takings clauses 
in their state constitutions differently from their federal counterpart, 
despite similar language.266 The Oregon court may have felt that the 
“parcel as a whole” rule would have led to unjust results considering that 
the bald eagle nest the government sought to protect was unoccupied.267 
Woodland Manor presents another potential means of avoiding Tahoe-
Sierra.268 The Rhode Island Superior Court cited the “spirit of the Takings 
Clause” in its discussion.269 The court’s subsequent horizontal (spatial) 
severance of twenty of the plaintiff’s eighty-nine acres for the purposes of 
evaluating the denominator directly contradicts the “parcel as a whole” 
 263. See supra notes 189–203 and accompanying text. 
 264. State ex rel. R.T.G., Inc. v. State, 780 N.E.2d 998, 1008–09 (Ohio 2002); Coast Range 
Conifers, L.L.C. v. State, 76 P.3d 1148, 1156 (Or. Ct. App. 2003); Woodland Manor, III Assocs. v. 
Reisma, No. C.A. PC89-2447, 2003 WL 1224248, at *15 (R.I. Super. Ct. Feb. 24, 2003); see supra 
notes 204–22 and accompanying text.  
 265. See supra notes 204–15 and accompanying text. 
 266. See supra notes 204–15 and accompanying text. The Johnson court in particular was 
motivated to find a temporary taking by the bad faith of the defendant, revealing that state 
constitutional claims may emerge as a means to avoid the potential injustice served by strict adherence 
to the “parcel as a whole” approach. Johnson v. City of Minneapolis, 667 N.W.2d 109, 112–13 (Minn. 
2003). Specifically, the City’s neglect made the pre-condemnation process needlessly burdensome on 
the plaintiffs in Johnson. See id.; see discussion supra note 215.  
 Likewise, the eagle nest protected by the restriction in Coast Range was unoccupied. Coast 
Range, 76 P.3d at 1149. Thus, the Coast Range court may have been motivated to seek alternate 
authorities to Tahoe-Sierra because of the apparent uselessness of the restriction against logging. See 
id. However, at least one commentator disagrees with this conclusion. See Derek O. Teaney, Note, 
Originalism as a Shot in the Arm for Land-Use Regulation: Regulatory “Takings” are Not 
Compensable Under a Traditional Originalist View of Article I, Section 18 of the Oregon Constitution, 
40 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 529, 532 n.14 (2004) (arguing that the Coast Range interpretation 
“empower[s] state and local governments to continue land-use regulation without concern for having 
to compensate landowners for ‘partial’ takings”).  
 In contrast to Johnson and Coast Range, in Sheffield, the Texas Supreme Court found that no 
taking had occurred despite abundant evidence of bad faith on the part of the City of Glenn Heights. 
Sheffield Dev. Co. v. City of Glenn Heights, 140 S.W.3d 660, 664–65, 679–80 (Tex. 2004). The City 
assured the plaintiff that no zoning changes would be made without notice when he purchased his 
property in 1996. Id. at 664. Even as the City made these assurances, they were meeting to discuss 
rezoning and in early 1997, and without prior notice, the City imposed a moratorium. Id. at 664–65; 
see also discussion supra note 215. 
 267. See supra notes 211–15 and accompanying text. 
 268. See supra notes 216–22 and accompanying text. 
 269. Woodland Manor, 2003 WL 1224248, at *15; see supra notes 216–22 and accompanying 
text. 
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approach.270 Although the Supreme Court has espoused its strong support 
of land use planning through its reaffirmation of the “parcel as a whole” 
approach,271 some state courts are resisting when fairness and justice seem 
to call for severing property interests.272 
2. Characterizing the Character of Government Action 
The character factor of the Penn Central test has been historically 
interpreted as drawing a distinction between physical and regulatory 
government action.273 Shortly after Penn Central, the Supreme Court 
declared physical appropriations per se unconstitutional.274 Few, if any, 
regulations failed the Penn Central test on account of the character factor 
in courts that adhered to this original interpretation.275 
Since Tahoe-Sierra, courts have interpreted the character factor in a 
variety of ways. In Santini, the Second Circuit utilized the historical 
approach and found that because the government’s nuclear waste site 
proposal did not amount to a physical appropriation, the character factor 
weighed against finding a taking.276 While the court labeled this analysis 
as part of its Penn Central assessment, the Second Circuit arguably 
interpreted the character factor quite differently.277 Before embarking on a 
Penn Central analysis, the Second Circuit quickly dismissed the claims 
after characterizing the government action as a pre-condemnation 
activity.278 Under this second interpretation of the character factor, the 
Second Circuit actually designated certain government actions, such as 
pre-condemnations activities, as per se constitutional.279  
While the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the character factor 
contains internal inconsistencies, the Federal Circuit has taken a more 
uniform approach to the character factor.280 In Bass, the Federal Circuit 
rejected the notion that the character factor weighed in favor of finding a 
taking so long as the regulated activity did not amount to a nuisance.281 
 270. See supra notes 216–22 and accompanying text.  
 271. See supra notes 91–96 and accompanying text. 
 272. See, e.g., Johnson, 667 N.W.2d at 115; see also Coast Range, 76 P.3d at 1156; Woodland 
Manor, 2003 WL 1224248, at *15. But see Sheffield, 140 S.W.3d at 664–65, 669. 
 273. See Eagle, supra note 24, at 3. 
 274. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435–36, 441 (1982). 
 275. See Eagle, supra note 24, at 3. 
 276. See supra notes 181–89 and accompanying text. 
 277. See supra notes 181–89 and accompanying text. 
 278. See supra notes 181–89 and accompanying text. 
 279. See supra notes 181–89 and accompanying text. 
 280. See supra notes 156–68, 172–79 and accompanying text.  
 281. See supra notes 156–63 and accompanying text. 
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Instead, the court looked to the underlying public benefit and purpose of 
the regulation.282 Similarly, in Appolo the court noted that the public health 
and safety served by mining restrictions justified the government’s 
action.283 
In contrast to the Federal Circuit, the New York Appellate Division’s 
approach in Friedenberg requires an examination of the “reciprocity of 
advantage.”284 Instead of looking to the worthy public cause served by the 
tidal wetlands restrictions, the court examined whether the plaintiff and the 
community at large shared relatively equally in the benefits and burdens of 
those restrictions.285 Under the Friedenberg approach, even the most 
worthy causes might still result in takings.286 This interpretation of the 
character factor finds some support in Penn Central itself.287 The Penn 
Central court considered at length whether the plaintiff shared in the 
benefits of the historical preservation law.288  
More so than the approaches of the Second Circuit and the Federal 
Circuit, the Friedenberg approach opens the door for takings plaintiffs.289 
Few plaintiffs could argue that wetlands regulations or mining regulations 
either constitute physical appropriations or do not serve public benefit.290 
However, many plaintiffs may be able to successfully argue that the 
benefits and burdens of regulations allotted to them as opposed to the 
public at large are grossly disproportionate.291 The Friedenberg approach 
harkens back to the language of Pennsylvania Coal itself by 
acknowledging that regulations serving even the most laudable goals may 
 282. See supra notes 156–63 and accompanying text. 
 283. See supra notes 172–79 and accompanying text.  
 284. See supra notes 197–203 and accompanying text. 
 285. See supra notes 197–203 and accompanying text. 
 286. See supra notes 197–203 and accompanying text. 
 287. See supra notes 49–54 and accompanying text.  
 288. See supra notes 49–54 and accompanying text. While Penn Central’s analysis of the 
character factor is best remembered for its distinction between physical and regulatory appropriations, 
Friedenberg’s revival of the “reciprocity of advantage” analysis is similarly well-founded. The 
“reciprocity of advantage” language has appeared in the case law since Penn Central, but Friedenberg 
has given it a place, possibly for the first time, within the Penn Central balancing test. See, e.g., 
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 341, 350 (2002) 
(utilizing the “reciprocity of advantage” principle as an over-arching theme rather than as an inquiry 
within the Penn Central balancing test); see also Andrew W. Schwartz, Reciprocity of Advantage: The 
Antidote to the Antidemocratic Trend in Regulatory Takings, 22 U.C.L.A. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 
61–62 (2003/2004) (proposing the “reciprocity of advantage” as a doctrine to guide regulatory takings 
jurisprudence in lieu of the Penn Central test). 
 289. See discussion supra note 288. 
 290. See supra notes 156–68, 172–79 and accompanying text. 
 291. See supra notes 197–203 and accompanying text. 
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go “too far.”292 Thus, the character factor may emerge as a new tool for 
takings plaintiffs to combat the effects of the “parcel as a whole.” 
3. A New Basis for Liability: “Rolling Moratoria” 
The rationale in Tahoe-Sierra could be interpreted to allow land use 
planners to evade the most intense possible scrutiny under the Takings 
Clause by implementing a series of short “rolling moratoria.”293 For 
example, in Tahoe-Sierra, the Supreme Court cautioned that special 
scrutiny should be used when dealing with any moratorium294 over one 
year in length.295 By negative implication, moratoria under one year in 
length are not scrutinized as intensely. A series of short consecutive 
moratoria could thus avoid the most intense level of scrutiny while having 
the same effect on property owners as a single longer moratorium. 
The Supreme Court found that principles of fairness and justice under 
the facts presented did not require the Court to evaluate the moratoria in 
Tahoe-Sierra as “rolling moratoria.”296 This statement implies that other 
factual scenarios might require adherence to one of the Court’s alternate 
grounds for liability such as the “rolling moratoria” basis. Cane reveals 
that lower courts will consider a “rolling moratoria” theory of takings in 
the wake of Tahoe-Sierra.297 However, the plaintiff must show that the 
moratoria are entirely sequential to prevail under this theory.298 Although 
neither the Tahoe-Sierra plaintiffs nor the Cane plaintiffs benefited from 
 292. See supra notes 197–203 and accompanying text. 
 293. See supra notes 108–11 and accompanying text; see also background discussion supra notes 
91–96.  
 294. Tahoe-Sierra’s rejection of temporal segmentation principally affects the temporal aspects of 
moratoria. A constitutionally defensible moratorium must be limited to the shortest possible time. See 
St. Amand & Merriam, supra note 12, at 958–59. The question remains: how long is the “shortest 
possible time?” In Tahoe-Sierra, thirty-two months was not too long, but this by no means vindicates 
all similarly long moratoria from scrutiny. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning 
Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 331–32, 341–42 (2002). 
 295. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 296. See supra notes 108–11 and accompanying text. 
 297. Cane Tenn. v. United States, 57 Fed. Cl. 115, 132–33 (Fed. Cl. 2003); see supra notes 148–
55 and accompanying text. 
 298. See supra notes 148–55 and accompanying text. Notably, the “rolling moratoria” as 
interpreted in Cane strictly requires sequential moratoria. Cane Tenn., 57 Fed. Cl. at 133. Any gap 
may preclude recovery. Id. Furthermore, the Cane court weighed the fact that it was not “bad faith” of 
the defendant, but a concerned citizens’ group, that brought about the extended delay when rejecting 
the “rolling moratoria” theory. Id. at 134. Thus, “rolling moratoria” must be sequential or accompanied 
by bad faith to afford recovery. See id. at 133–34. This “rolling moratoria” safeguard provides a check 
on the potential of an artificial linguistic division between temporary and permanent regulations feared 
by Chief Justice Rehnquist. See discussion supra note 97. 
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this “rolling moratoria” theory, it may serve as a safeguard from potential 
abuse by land use planners.299 
CONCLUSION: FAIRNESS AND JUSTICE AFTER TAHOE-SIERRA 
Regulatory takings jurisprudence was founded on the notion that land 
use restrictions sometimes go “too far” resulting in injustice.300 The 
constitutional protections of property owners against takings were highest 
before Tahoe-Sierra’s rejection of temporal segmentation effectively 
ended the short lifespan of Lucas301 per se temporary takings.302 Recent 
case law suggests that the Supreme Court’s rejection of segmentation in 
favor of the “parcel as a whole” approach also diminished both temporary 
and permanent takings plaintiffs’ potential for success under the Penn 
Central rationale.303 Strict adherence to the “parcel as a whole” approach 
may also have the unfortunate result of compromising the rights of 
property owners against unconstitutional takings in some situations.304 
This danger may have prompted some courts to turn to the alternate 
remedies listed in the Tahoe-Sierra dicta305 or to fashion their own 
remedies under state law.306 Other courts may attempt to reshape the 
character factor of the Penn Central test to the advantage of property 
owners.307 This emergence of alternate rationales reflects the notion that 
the strict adherence to the “parcel as a whole” solution to the denominator 
problem as set forth in Tahoe-Sierra may result in unfairness and injustice 
in certain situations.308 The future may hold more divergent interpretations 
of takings principles as courts consider these notions in addition to the 
“parcel as a whole” analysis in an attempt to preserve the foundations of 
fairness and justice of takings jurisprudence.309 
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 300. See supra notes 25–31 and accompanying text. 
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